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STILL CRYING OUT FOR A “MAJOR OVERHAUL” AFTER ALL THESE YEARS—SALMON
AND ANOTHER FAILED BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON COLUMBIA BASIN
HYDROELECTRIC OPERATIONS
BY
MICHAEL C. BLUMM,* JULIANE L. FRY,** & OLIVIER JAMIN***

For nearly four decades, national policy has been to restore Columbia
Basin salmon devastated by the construction and operation of the Federal
Columbia River Power System (FCRPS). In the 1980 Northwest Power Act,
Congress declared that salmon restoration was a national priority and that it
would be funded largely through federal hydropower sales. A basinwide plan
approved by the Northwest states began the restoration effort in 1982, but
since that plan did not focus on wild salmon restoration, it was soon eclipsed
by federal biological opinions (BiOps) after the listing of several salmon species
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in the early 1990s. There followed a
seemingly endless series of court challenges to the adequacy of the BiOps,
most of which succeeded.
Although we discuss all of the Columbia Basin ESA salmon court decisions
over the last quarter-century, our focus is on the 2016 decision, a remarkable
149-page opinion that is a paragon of close judicial review. United States
District Judge Michael H. Simon became the third consecutive federal judge to
find the federal BiOp on FCRPS hydroelectric operations wanting, but he did so
in much greater detail and scope than did his predecessors. The result was a
judicial opinion that could produce substantial changes in the way the federal
government approaches ESA compliance of the world’s largest integrated
hydroelectric system. Some of those changes were evident in an ensuing 2017
decision ordering increased spills of water at mainstem dams to facilitate
downstream fish passage.
Like his predecessors, Judge Simon faulted the federal government for
failing to ensure that the mitigation measures—which the FCRPS BiOp
assumed would produce immediate, significant benefits—were actually
“reasonably certain to occur.” In addition, among other shortcomings, he
determined that the BiOp failed to 1) employ a proper methodology for
evaluating species jeopardy in its BiOp; 2) account for the low abundance
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levels and declining recruits per spawning salmon without an adequate margin
of safety; 3) rationally examine recovery of the listed species; 4) consider
effects of climate change on the mitigation measures; and 5) prepare a
programmatic environmental impact statement (EIS) on the cumulative
effects of those measures and reasonable alternatives.
Implementation of Judge Simon’s opinion, if carried out faithfully, could
substantially improve prospects for the recovery of the thirteen ESA-listed
salmon runs. The opinion also may establish important ESA precedent
concerning the species jeopardy that BiOps are to avoid, the critical habitat
that BiOps are supposed to protect, and the relationship between BiOp
implementation and procedures necessary to satisfy the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Concerning the latter, perhaps the most
arresting aspect of the Simon opinion was the strong suggestion that the EIS
the court ordered should include an evaluation of the alternative of breaching
the four federal dams on the lower Snake River. However, perhaps more
significant in terms of the forthcoming BiOp, the court was insistent that the
burden of uncertainty no longer be shouldered by the listed species. Although
a court may encourage the FCRPS agencies to consider dam breaching as a
NEPA alternative, neither the agencies nor a court have authority to order dam
breaching, a power that lies exclusively with Congress in the case of federal
dams.
The 2017 injunction ordering increased spills beginning in 2018 promised
the first substantive improvement in fish passage due to changed hydroelectric
project operations since United States District Judge James A. Redden ordered
spills over a dozen years earlier in 2005. This injunctive relief, which also
included promised judicial scrutiny of large-scale expenditures at the lower
Snake dams, is interim—pending completion of revised BiOp and the new EIS
that Judge Simon ordered. But the injunction may reflect the fact that the
longstanding federal effort to direct attention away from dam operations to
offsite habitat creation and restoration and hatchery production has not
entirely succeeded. If so, that is a good omen for the fate of imperiled Columbia
Basin salmon.
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“[The 1993 BiOp] is “seriously, ‘significantly’ flawed because it is too heavily
geared toward a status quo that has allowed all forms of river activity to proceed in
a deficit situation—that is, relatively small steps, minor improvements and
adjustments—when the situation literally cries out for a major overhaul.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2016, for the sixth time in just over two decades, the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) failed to comply with the Endangered Species Act2 (ESA) in
its biological opinion (BiOp) on Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS)
operations.3 Columbia Basin dams are a principal reason for the listing of thirteen
salmonid species for ESA protection, and NMFS has been trying to meet the
requirements of the ESA for nearly a quarter-century, largely unsuccessfully. 4
Although the ESA experience with Columbia Basin salmon has been mostly futile in
terms of restoring the listed salmon,5 the listings have, ironically, materially affected
federal implementation of the ESA.6 There are many such ironies in the Columbia
Basin salmon saga.
The repeated failure of federal BiOps to satisfy the ESA has occurred under the
watch of three separate federal district court judges: Malcolm F. Marsh, James A.
Redden, and now Michael H. Simon,7 and despite nearly $1 billion in fish habitat
1 Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 900 (D. Or. 1994)
(Marsh, J.), vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995).
2 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012).
3 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-cv-0640-SI, 2017 WL 1135610, at *3
(D. Or. Mar. 27, 2017). NMFS is also known as National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
Fisheries. In the interest of clarity, NMFS will be used in this Article.
4 See generally John Harrison, Endangered Species Act and Columbia River Salmon and Steelhead,
NW. POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL (May 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/W85C-2FE9 (discussing several
attempts by NMFS from 1993 to the present to meet ESA requirements).
5 In 1996, the National Academy of Sciences reported that Pacific salmon had disappeared from
40% of their historical breeding range in Washington, Idaho, Oregon, and California, and in many cases
where populations are now stable, they are composed largely or entirely of hatchery fish. COMM. ON
PROT. & MGMT. OF PAC. NW. ANADROMOUS SALMONIDS, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., UPSTREAM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN
THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 2 (1996). Although 2002 and 2003 witnessed record returns of many salmon
populations in the Columbia River Basin, NMFS observed that hatchery fish comprised the majority of
these returns (e.g., 69% of Snake River spring/summer chinook salmon and up to 90% of upper Columbia
River spring chinook). See Michael C. Blumm et al., Practiced at the Art of Deception: The Failure of
Columbia Basin Salmon Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 36 ENVTL. L. 709, 719–24 (2006)
[hereinafter Practicing Deception]. Further, favorable ocean conditions facilitated large salmon returns,
while long-term growth remained below replacement rates required for recovery. Id. at 724.
6 See Michael C. Blumm & Greg D. Corbin, Salmon and the Endangered Species Act: Lessons from
the Columbia River Basin, 74 WASH. L. REV. 519, 599–601 (1999) (explaining that the salmon listings
affected ESA implementation by: 1) causing NMFS to define salmonid species as “evolutionarily
significant units” (ESUs); 2) streamlining the biological consultation process through so-called “summary
concurrences”; 3) using multi-year BiOps; 4) invoking consultation to implement pre-existing ecosystem
management plans; and 5) defining the ESA-required “best available” science to include
intergovernmental consultation among other agencies and tribes with scientific expertise).
7 Judge Marsh first found NMFS’s 1993 BiOp “seriously flawed.” Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l
Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 900 (D. Or. 1994), vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995).
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restoration funds offered by the region’s federal power broker, the Bonneville
Power Administration (BPA), to state and tribal governments to drop their legal
opposition to the BiOps.8 This effort succeeded only partially as the State of
Washington and several tribes accepted the federal money;9 but the State of
Oregon and the Nez Perce Tribe did not, and they proceeded with the litigation,
along with a number of environmental groups. 10
A hallmark of all recent FCRPS BiOps has been a federal effort to shift attention
from the salmon mortalities caused by mainstem dams and their operation (which
generate substantial hydropower revenues) to focus on so-called “off-site
mitigation measures,” mostly habitat restoration and hatchery production.11 These
off-site measures, which the BiOps assumed would produce immediate and
considerable survival benefits, have failed to survive judicial review because most
have not proved to be “reasonably certain to occur.” 12 Judge Simon reiterated Judge
He subsequently upheld the agency’s 1995 BiOp, despite serious misgivings about NMFS’s risk tolerance
in American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Service, No. Civ. 96-384-MA, 1997 WL 33797790, at *9
(D. Or. Apr. 3, 1997). Judge Redden rejected the 2000 BiOp in National Wildlife Federation v. National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS I), 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196 at 1211 (D. Or. 2003), and he rejected the 2004
BiOp in National Wildlife Federation v. Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS II), No. 3:01-cv-0640-RE, 2005 WL
1278878 at *7 (D. Or. May 26, 2005), aff’d, 524 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2008). Redden also invalidated the
2008 BiOp, as amended in 2010. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NMFS IV), 839 F.
Supp. 2d 1117, 1131 (D. Or. 2011). These decisions—and several related ones—are discussed in Michael
C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Role of the Judge in ESA Implementation: District Judge James Redden
and the Columbia Basin Salmon Saga, 32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 87, 111–29 (2013). Judge Simon’s first decision
on the FCRPS is the subject of this Article. For a timeline covering these decisions, see Appendix A.
8 2008 Columbia Basin Fish Accords: Memorandum of Agreement Between the Treaty Tribes and
FCRPS Action Agencies 1, 10–12, 17, 19 & B-1 (2008) [hereinafter Columbia Basin Fish Accords],
https://perma.cc/VY97-637N; William McCall, BPA, Tribes Reach $900 Million Deal to Help Columbia
River Salmon, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 7, 2008), https://perma.cc/HZY4-4Z9L.
9 Columbia Basin Fish Accords, supra note 8. Technically, Washington did not sign an accord in
which the state promised not to participate in the suit challenging the 2014 BiOp. The state, which
supported NMFS concerning both the 2000 and 2008 BiOps (but not the 2004 BiOp)—well before BPA
offered habitat funding through the accords—agreed to coordinate habitat restoration in the Columbia
River estuary in a 2009 memorandum of agreement, in which Washington agreed that the “FCRPS and
Upper Snake BiOps (including hydro operation, configuration, and water management provisions) satisfy
ESA requirements during their terms.” Memorandum of Agreement on Columbia River Estuary Habitat
Actions Between the State of Washington, BPA, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps),
and the Bureau of Reclamation (Sept. 16, 2009), https://perma.cc/2R4C-8764.
10 McCall, supra note 8. The Nez Perce Tribe supported the plaintiffs by filing an amicus brief. Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NMFS V), 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 882 (D. Or. 2016); Nez Perce
Tribe’s Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment, NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d
861 (No. 3:01-cv-0640-SI), ECF No. 1984. The environmental plaintiffs included the National Wildlife
Federation, the Idaho Wildlife Federation, the Washington Wildlife Federation, the Sierra Club, the
Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Association, the Institute for Fisheries Resources, the Idaho
Rivers United, the Northwest Sport Fishing Industry Association, Salmon for All, Columbia Riverkeeper,
the NW Energy Coalition, the Federation of Fly Fishers, and American Rivers. NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at
868 n.1.
11 The focus on off-site habitat restoration began with the 2000 BiOp. Blumm & Paulsen, supra note
7, at 116.
12 NMFS I, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1215 (D. Or. 2003) (finding that the agency improperly relied on
off-site mitigation measures that were not reasonably certain to occur); NMFS IV, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117,
1125–28 (D. Or. 2011) (finding that habitat mitigation was not reasonably certain to occur); NMFS V, 184
F. Supp. 3d at 876, 903–04, 906, 949 (finding several mitigation measures were not reasonably likely to
occur).
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Redden’s repeated holdings on this issue in his 2016 decision.13 And he went
considerably farther, deciding that NMFS employed an improper jeopardy
standard—“trending toward recovery”—that ignored the desperate current
situation of Columbia Basin listed salmon. 14
Judge Simon also determined that the current BiOp failed to rationally
evaluate recovery prospects or assess the effects of climate change on the
mitigation measures NMFS claimed would avoid jeopardy.15 Finally, he decided that
implementation of these measures required preparation of a programmatic
environmental impact statement (EIS), which he strongly suggested should include
consideration of the alternative of breaching the lower Snake River dams.16
The upshot of the 2016 decision was another remand to NMFS to produce a
new BiOp that would satisfy the ESA. 17 But like his predecessors, Judge Simon did
not enjoin ongoing FCRPS operations, a result that has not encouraged NMFS or the
action agencies to comply with the ESA in the past.18 Although there might not be
a good alternative—since enjoining FCRPS operations is unrealistic (as judges have
no power over streamflows and lack expertise concerning dam operations)—part
of the reason for the repeated federal failure to comply with the ESA may be the
lack of enforceable sanctions over an ongoing activity like hydropower operations.
Perhaps there is some form of innovative injunctive relief that could require the
involved federal agencies to begin to take the judicial opinions more seriously than
they have over the last two decades.19

13

NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 906–09.
Id. at 892–95. We include listed steelhead trout (Salmonidae Oncorhynchus mykiss) with salmon
(Salmonidae Oncorhynchus), as Indian tribes have always considered steelhead to be salmon and they
belong to the same genus. John Harrison, First-Salmon Ceremony, NW. POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL
(Oct. 28, 2008), https://perma.cc/D4A5-PHVT.
15 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 917–23.
16 Id. at 942–44. On the scientific, economic, and legal grounds for breaching these dams, see
generally Michael C. Blumm et al., Saving Snake River Water and Salmon Simultaneously: The Biological,
Economic, and Legal Case for Breaching the Lower Snake River Dams, Lowering John Day Reservoir, and
Restoring Natural River Flows, 28 ENVTL. L. 997 (1998).
17 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 949–50.
18 Id.; Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 901 (D. Or. 1994),
vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995); Am. Rivers v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. Civ. 96–
384–MA, 1997 WL 33797790, at *14 (D. Or. Apr. 3, 1997); NMFS I, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1215 (D. Or.
2003); NMFS II, No. 3:01-cv-0640-RE, 2005 WL 1278878, at *22 (D. Or. May 26, 2005), aff’d 524 F.3d 917,
938 (9th Cir. 2008); NMFS IV, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1131 (D. Or. 2011); see also Appendix A (charting
these decisions along a timeline).
19 The federal role in the operation of the Federal Columbia Basin is complicated. BPA, which sells
power from federal dams (and other sources), is the dominant entity. See generally BONNEVILLE POWER
ADMIN. ET AL., THE COLUMBIA RIVER SYSTEM INSIDE STORY, at 19 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter BPA INSIDE STORY],
https://perma.cc/UA6Y-TFVE. The Corps and the Bureau of Reclamation operate the federal dams, while
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates nonfederal projects, including five large,
mainstream dams on the mid-Columbia and Idaho Power’s Hells Canyon dams on the Snake. Id. at 18–
19. For a full list of FERC-licensed dams, see Complete List of Active Licenses, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION,
https://perma.cc/U3S3-AC6Z (last updated Mar. 8, 2017). NMFS has responsibilities under the
Endangered Species Act for salmon, which accounts for NMFS as the lead federal defendant in the longrunning litigation over ESA compliance concerning annual hydroelectric operations. BPA INSIDE STORY,
supra, at 20. Judge Redden imposed numerous study and reporting requirements on federal agencies
during earlier remand periods. Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 7, at 143–44.
14
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Above all, Judge Simon’s 2016 decision reflected an exacting approach to
reviewing ESA implementation. Given the sorry history of Columbia Basin salmon
restoration, this “hard look” review was a welcome development, perhaps
attributable to the influence of numerous failures over time.20 The long history of
failure—following repeated, inaccuate government predictions21—must have
influenced the reviewing judge. When “expert” agencies continuously fail to deliver
on their promises over a long period of time, judicial deference to agency expertise
should diminish. The Columbia Basin salmon saga may be a prime exhibit for this
proposition.
This Article assesses the latest—and perhaps most interesting—decision in the
long-running Columbia Basin salmon–hydropower conflict. Part II discusses the
relevant background, and there is a good deal of that necessary to understand the
context of the 2016 decision and its significance. Part III explores Judge Simon’s
opinion finding the NMFS BiOp once again to be inadequate, examining his
decisions on 1) the proper standard for “jeopardy” under the ESA, 2) the
requirement that mitigation measures be specific and enforceable, 3) the need for
a thorough analysis of the effect of climate change on those mitigations measures,
4) the effect of FCRPS operations on critical habitat, and 5) the applicability of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to the implementation of ESA mitigation
measures. Part IV explains Judge Simon’s 2017 decision requiring increased spills of
water at mainstem dam beginning in 2018 to facilitate juvenile fish passage, which
will be the most significant FCRPS operational change in over a dozen years. Part V
considers the significance of the Simon decision in light of the earlier decisions of
Judges Marsh and Redden.
We conclude that Judge Simon’s close review of NMFS latest BiOp was
warranted in light of the unwillingness of the federal government to take seriously
the need to restructure hydroelectric operations. However, prospects for significant
improvement in the future are not promising if they must continue to rely on court
review. Over the past two decades the courts have repeatedly found fault with
federal efforts to restore Columbia Basin salmon, but the courts cannot run the
complex FCRPS. Until there is a commitment on the part of those federal agencies
controlling the system—particularly BPA, the real “power broker in the region”22—
to take seriously their obligation to protect the Columbia’s salmon runs, significant
restoration of the listed salmon is unlikely.
II. THE 1993–2008 BIOPS: A HISTORY OF SHIFTING JEOPARDY STANDARDS
The 2014 BiOp failed to pass Judge Simon’s review in the latest round of
litigation on grounds both similar to earlier decisions by Judge Redden—assuming
considerable survival benefits to the listed species due to habitat mitigation actions

20 See, e.g., J. Tavener Holland, Regulatory Daubert: A Panacea for the Endangered Species Act’s
“Best Available Science” Mandate, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 299, 309 (2008) (“[J]udicial review of agency
decisions should encompass a searching, ‘hard look’ review.”).
21 See discussion infra Part III.B.
22 See Jeffrey P. Foote et al., The Bonneville Power Administration: The Northwest Power Broker, 6
ENVTL. L. 831, 831 (1976).
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that were not reasonably certain to occur 23—as well as new problems, including 1)
NMFS’s use of an improper jeopardy standard; 2) an inadequate analysis of the
effects of climate change; and 3) a failure to prepare an EIS concerning
implementation of the BiOp’s reasonable and prudent alternatives (RPAs). 24
However, in his discussion of NMFS’s analysis of critical habitat, Judge Simon issued
a more confusing decision. He ruled that although the agency’s “retaining the
current ability to become functional” standard failed to comply with the ESA,
NMFS’s conclusion that the RPA would not adversely modify the designated critical
habitat was not unreasonable. 25 The following sections describe each of these
elements of the decision in some detail.
Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act requires federal agencies to
insure that their discretionary actions will not “jeopardize the continued
existence . . . or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat” of a
listed species.26 To determine whether an action will jeopardize a listed species,
NMFS must, according to its regulations, ascertain whether the action will “reduce
appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the
wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species.” 27
Because the agency retains substantial discretion in implementing this regulatory
definition, the framework for determining whether proposed hydropower
operations would produce jeopardy has evolved over time.
NMFS refined the standard in its 1995 BiOp to require protection of both a
listed species’ survival and its recovery.28 Beginning in the 2008 BiOp, NMFS phrased
this inquiry as “whether the species can be expected to survive with an adequate

23

NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 870 (D. Or. 2016).
Id. at 876.
25 Id. at 930–33. Judge Simon upheld NMFS’s analysis on this issue because “significant
improvements to the mainstem habitat” made NMFS’s conclusion “not irrational or in clear error.” Id. at
933. For a more thorough discussion of this topic, see infra Part III.D.
26 ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012) (“Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the
assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency
(hereinafter in this section referred to as an ‘agency action’) is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after consultation as
appropriate with affected States, to be critical . . . .”).
27 50 C.F.R. §402.02 (2016) (defining jeopardy).
28 See NW. REGION, NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION: REINITIATION OF CONSULTATION ON
1994–1998 OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM AND JUVENILE TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM
IN 1995 AND FUTURE YEARS 10–11 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 BIOP], https://perma.cc/39WZ-YCPA (referring
to the consultation regulatory definition of “jeopardize the continued existence of” and the 1994 Draft
Section 7 Endangered Species Consultation Handbook regulatory definitions of “survival” and
“recovery”). NMFS’s jeopardy standard interpreted 50 C.F.R. § 402.02, which defines jeopardy to include
“both the survival and recovery” as parallel goals, with no distinction in the stringency of assessment
required. Judge Simon rejected NMFS’s argument that including precise recovery abundance levels
would improperly incorporate ESA recovery planning called for by section 4 of the statute into the
section 7 consultation process, stating that “[w]ithout tying its recovery metrics to any rough estimated
recovery abundance level or time frame, however, NOAA Fisheries cannot rationally conclude that the
RPA actions will not appreciably reduce the species' chances of recovery.” NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at
894.
24
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potential for recovery—e.g., trending toward recovery.”29 The 2014 BiOp’s
foremost failure was its reliance on this jeopardy standard, which Judge Simon
thought was inconsistent with the ESA. 30 Before discussing the reasons that the
judge struck down NMFS’s trending toward recovery standard in the 2014 BiOp, this
Part outlines the history of the moving target of jeopardy established in the
hydroelectric BiOps over the past quarter-century.
A. No Jeopardy BiOps
The first BiOp the federal government issued on the operation of federal
Columbia Basin dams in 1992 followed the first ESA salmon listing.31 In both this
BiOp and an ensuing 1993 BiOp, NMFS reached “no jeopardy” conclusions. The
1992 BiOp based its no jeopardy determination on an assessment that “reduction
in mortality represents progress toward reversing the decline of listed and
proposed species,” apparently suggesting that any improvement satisfied the
statute.32 The 1993 BiOp assumed that flow augmentation and spill measures
adopted by the federal agencies, along with improvements in structures and fish
bypass facilities, “have reduced the anticipated mortality . . . adequately for the
purposes of the 1993 consultation.”33 Idaho, along with Oregon and the Northwest
Resource Information Center as intervenors and several tribes participating as
amici,34 challenged the 1993 BiOp based on NMFS reliance on life-cycle modeling of
estimated salmon mortality and a 1986–1990 baseline period—a period of record
low salmon runs that led to the species’ listing.35
Judge Marsh decided that the 1993 BiOp’s jeopardy analysis failed to satisfy
the ESA because NMFS had arbitrarily omitted consideration of the full range of risk
assumptions, instead relying selectively upon “uncertain favorable model results
[while rejecting] other equally uncertain model results tending to undermine a no

29 NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT SECTION 7(A)(2) CONSULTATION BIOLOGICAL
OPINION AND MAGNUSON-STEVENS FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT ESSENTIAL FISH HABITAT
CONSULTATION: CONSULTATION ON REMAND FOR OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM 1-10
(2008) [hereinafter 2008 BIOP], https://perma.cc/P643-VQ2H. NMFS interpreted “trending toward
recovery” to mean that the standard was met if one more fish returned than the previous year, even if
actual recovery was in the distant future. Id. at xxix, 1-12
30 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 949.
31 Pac. Nw. Generating Coop. v. Brown, 822 F. Supp. 1479, 1483 (D. Or. 1993), aff’d, 38 F.3d 1058
(9th Cir. 1994).
32 NW. REGION,
NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT SECTION 7
CONSULTATION/CONFERENCE BIOLOGICAL OPINION 50 (1992).
33 Letter from Nancy Forester, Acting Assistant Adm’r for Fisheries, Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., to
Randall Hardy, Adm’r, Bonneville Power Admin. (May 26, 1993) (on file with author).
34 The participating tribes were the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla, Warm Springs, and Yakama
reservations, and the Nez Perce Tribe.
35 Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 891–93 (D. Or. 1994),
vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995). The 1993 BiOp used results from three life-cycle models:
1) BPA’s Stochastic Life–Cycle Model; 2) Northwest Power Planning Council’s System Planning Model;
and 3) State and Tribal Fisheries Agencies’ Empirical Life–Cycle Model. Id. at 896.
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jeopardy conclusion.”36 Also objectionable to the court was the baseline NMFS
chose to judge improvements: years of extremely low returns, meaning that it
would be easier for the agency to show improvement.37 Judge Marsh saw through
NMFS’s manipulations of the baseline period as an effort to maintain hydropower
generation instead of attempting to reduce the effect of hydropower on declining
salmon runs. He concluded that the BiOp was so committed to maintaining status
quo hydroelectric operations that ESA compliance would require “a major
overhaul.”38 The judge therefore remanded the BiOp for NMFS to revise. 39
B. Jeopardy BiOps
The 1995 BiOp was the first to reach a jeopardy finding for the listed species.40
This BiOp also was the first time NMFS incorporated recovery into its analysis, as
the 1992 and 1993 BiOps had focused exclusively on survival.41 The new recovery
standard required the agency to determine “whether the species can be expected
to survive with an adequate potential for recovery under the effects of the
proposed or continuing action.”42 The 1995 BiOp adopted a dual-probability
standard, requiring the proposed actions to demonstrate a “high likelihood” of
species survival, but only a “moderate to high likelihood” of recovery. 43 This dualprobability standard was only the first of a series of weakening interpretations of
what recovery required. Also beginning in 1995, BiOps began to encompass fiveyear periods, relieving the operating agencies from annual consultation.44
Because of its jeopardy finding, in 1995, for the first time, NMFS had to include
RPAs to avoid jeopardy in its BiOp, including flow augmentation, spill, and juvenile
fish transportation as “immediate” actions to avoid jeopardy.45 A group of
environmentalists led by American Rivers challenged the BiOp, alleging that it did
not adequately explain how its RPAs would avoid jeopardy and claiming that the
time period used for the recovery analysis was too long to be protective. 46 But Judge

36 Id. at 898–99 (“Especially in light of the perilously low numbers of Snake River sockeye and fall
chinook expected in 1993. . . , I also find that NMFS should have fully considered the enhanced risks
associated with small populations prior to discounting low range assumptions.”).
37 Id. at 893 (“It is clear that a longer base period which includes years of higher abundance levels
would have encompassed higher escapement levels and would have resulted in a higher goal.”).
38 Id. at 900.
39 Id. at 900–01.
40 See 1995 BIOP, supra note 28, at 83–91.
41 Id. at 13; Practicing Deception, supra note 5, at 738.
42 1995 BIOP, supra note 28, at 13.
43 Id. at 14; see also id. at 78 (defining a “high likelihood” as a 70% probability and a “moderate
likelihood” as a 50% of recovery).
44 See Blumm & Corbin, supra note 6, at 552. The 1995 BiOp applied during 1994–1998. 1995 BIOP,
supra note 28, at 7.
45 1995 BIOP, supra note 28, at 91–139; see also Practicing Deception, supra note 5, at 743–48
(pointing out that NMFS structured these requirements so that they could be modified or suspended in
order to maintain hydropower operations status quo).
46 Am. Rivers v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. Civ. 96–384–MA, 1997 WL 33797790, at *1 (D. Or.
Apr. 3, 1997), aff’d, 168 F.3d 497 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision). Notably, the State of Idaho,
which led the challenge to the 1993 BiOp, switched sides and now supported NMFS’s 1995 BiOp. Id. at
*2 The Columbia Basin tribes were also now split, and no longer were all amici on the plaintiffs’ side. See
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Marsh deferred to the agency and upheld the 1995 BiOp, although he expressed
considerable skepticism about its conclusions. 47 The 1995 BiOp was the only BiOp
to survive judicial review in the past quarter-century. The Ninth Circuit upheld Judge
Marsh’s decision in 1999.48
The next BiOp, in 2000, also concluded that dam operations would jeopardize
the listed Columbia Basin salmonid species, which then numbered twelve.49 This
jeopardy finding again necessitated RPAs to reduce the harm to the listed species
from dam operations. The 2000 RPAs included a number of off-site habitat
improvement measures as part of a so-called basinwide recovery strategy, which
shifted the focus of restoration efforts toward off-site habitat restoration and away
from hydropower operations.50 This BiOp was challenged by a group of
environmentalists, now led by the National Wildlife Federation.51 Judge Redden—
who succeeded Judge Marsh as the presiding judge—struck down the 2000 BiOp
because the off-site habitat measures were “not reasonably certain to occur.”52
In the 2000 BiOp, NMFS interpreted the recovery prong of the jeopardy
standard to require both quantitative abundance goals and a time frame for
reaching recovery.53 But in response to Judge Redden’s opinion, in the 2004 BiOp,
the Bush Administration adopted a radically new jeopardy analysis. The new
Blumm & Corbin, supra note 6, at 557 (noting that the upper basin Colvillle and Spokane tribes sought
to protect reservoir levels in Lake Roosevelt, formed by Grand Coulee Dam, which might be lowered to
achieve the river flows advocated by the lower basin tribes).
47 Am. Rivers, 1997 WL 33797790, at *10. Judge Marsh wrote that “the ESA says nothing about risk
tolerance and the limits of judicial review dictate that I not interfere with a federal agencies’ exercise of
professional judgment or their reasoned decisions.” Id. at *10. Judge Marsh decided that NMFS had
“provided a reasoned evaluation of all five factors of the jeopardy analysis and [had] adequately
explained its limited reliance upon lifecycle model results,” and that given existing uncertainties about
whether transportation or in-river migration improvements would provide better mitigation, he could
not “find that NMFS’s failure to select a single strategy to pursue . . . is arbitrary or capricious.” Id. Judge
Simon later was unwilling to impose the risks of these uncertainties on the endangered species. See
NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d. 861, 895 (D. Or. 2016).
48 Am. Rivers v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 168 F.3d 497 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table
decision).
49 NW. REGION, NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION: REINITIATION OF CONSULTATION ON
OPERATIONS OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM, INCLUDING THE JUVENILE FISH TRANSPORTATION
PROGRAM AND 19 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION PROJECTS IN THE COLUMBIA BASIN 1-6 to -7 (2000) [hereinafter 2000
BIOP].
50 Id. at 9-2.
51 NMFS I, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199 (D. Or. 2003). In addition to the National Wildlife Federation,
the environmental groups challenging the BiOp were the Idaho Wildlife Federation, the Washington
Wildlife Federation, the Sierra Club, Trout Unlimited, the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s
Associations, the Institute for Fisheries Resources, Idaho Rivers United, Idaho Steelhead and Salmon
United, the Northwest Sportfishing Industry Association, Friends of the Earth, Salmon for All, and
Columbia Riverkeeper.
52 Id. at 1215. Judge Marsh quoted Center for Biological Diversity v. Rumsfeld, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1139,
1152 (D. Ariz. 2002), with approval. Id. at 1207 (quoting Rumsfeld, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1152) (“Mitigation
measures must be reasonably specific, certain to occur, and capable of implementation; they must be
subject to deadlines or otherwise-enforceable obligations; and most important, they must address the
threats to the species in a way that satisfies the jeopardy and adverse modification standards.” (citing
Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1987)).
53 See 2000 BIOP, supra note 49, at 1-14, 1-15 tbl.1.3-1. See generally supra notes 27–29 and
accompanying text (discussing the regulatory origin of the “survival” and “recovery” prongs of jeopardy
analysis).
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approach removed the quantitative abundance targets and time frames, and
instead proceeded through five narrative steps to analyze proposed actions in a socalled “comparative approach” that evaluated incremental adverse effects of the
proposed action against an environmental baseline that included existing dams. 54
Since NMFS now considered the dams to be part of the environmental baseline and
their operation was allegedly “nondiscretionary,” the 2004 BiOp essentially
exempted dam operations from section 7 analysis. 55 Consequently, the BiOp
declared that there was no jeopardy to listed species. 56
The National Wildlife Federation and others challenged the 2004 BiOp, and
Judge Redden concluded that the new jeopardy definition unlawfully restricted
NMFS’s jeopardy analysis to the effects from so-called “discretionary” aspects of
the proposed action over which agencies have control.57 Thus, alleged
nondiscretionary actions, like dam operations actions, were now part of the
environmental baseline and not subject to ESA consultation.58 This interpretation,
the plaintiffs maintained, allowed the agency to omit consideration of the
substantial adverse effects produced by dam operations. 59 Judge Redden agreed
and struck down the 2004 BiOp.60
54 NW. REGION, NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION, CONSULTATION ON REMAND FOR
OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM AND 19 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION PROJECTS IN THE
COLUMBIA BASIN 1-5 to -6 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 BIOP]; see also Practicing Deception, supra note 5, at
771 (discussing the comparative approach to jeopardy used by NMFS).
55 See NMFS II, No. 3:01-cv-0640-RE, 2005 WL 1278878 at *10–11 (D. Or. May 26, 2005), aff’d, 524
F.3d 917, 938 (9th Cir. 2008).
56 2004 BIOP, supra note 54, at 8-4 to -38 & tbl.8.1 (repeatedly exempting so-called nondiscretionary hydro operations from the jeopardy analysis).
57 See NMFS II, 2005 WL 1278878, at *13.
58 See Practicing Deception, supra note 5, at 772. The 2004 jeopardy analysis focused only on
whether a proposed action would diminish the species’ likelihood of survival or recovery when compared
to the effects of the environmental baseline. Id.
59 See NMFS II, 2005 WL 1278878, at *8–9.
60 Judge Redden concluded that NMFS’s new approach to jeopardy analysis was arbitrary and
capricious because:

What [NMFS] has in effect done in the 2004BiOp is compare the proposed action to the share of
the proposed action it chose to re-categorize as part of the environmental baseline, rather than
properly evaluating the proposed action in its entirety. . . .
....
[NMFS’s] comparative approach improperly circumscribes the effects of the action by basing
the jeopardy decision on [NMFS’s] estimate of the impacts attributable only to “discretionary”
elements of the proposed action. This has the effect of substantially lowering the threshold
required for the mitigation elements of the proposed action. The ‘net effects’ analysis operates
only on a portion of impacts properly attributable to the action as a whole, instead of needing to
offset impacts attributable to the entirety of the action-discretionary and nondiscretionary
elements alike. Only a comprehensive approach to jeopardy analysis will meet the statutory
mandate.
Id. at *13–14 (footnote omitted). Given the practical inability to enjoin streamflows and the infeasibility
of completely restricting hydropower operations through judicial decree, Judge Redden’s injunction
required the parties only to engage in ongoing consultation and discussion (with court-overseen status
conferences) to determine which elements of the RPAs would remain in place during a remand. Id. at
*17. More significant injunctive relief came six weeks later, when in order “to avoid irreparable harm to
juvenile fall chinook and other listed species,” Judge Redden ordered specified spill at certain dams. Nat’l
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In 2004, while NMFS was preparing the 2004 BiOp, the United States Army
Corps of Engineers (the Corps) issued a “statement of decision” curtailing summer
spill at four Columbia Basin dams.61 The proposal would have eliminated spills at
The Dalles and Bonneville Dams for the entire month of August and at the Ice
Harbor and John Day Dams during the last week of August, potentially resulting in
a loss of up to 377,000 listed juvenile salmon. 62 NMFS surprisingly accepted this
proposal in its 2004 BiOp, even though its 2000 BiOp cited the spill program as an
important element of successful salmon mitigation.63 The 2004 BiOp sugested that
the spill curtailment would generate an additional $18–28 million in revenue from
increased hydropower sales which could support measures to mitigate the adverse
effects of curtailing spill.64
Environmental groups proceeded to file suit, claiming that NMFS illegally
modified the summer spill program established in the 2000 BiOp. 65 Judge Redden
rejected curtailing spill because of “fundamental defects” in the agency’s reasoning,
which was based on “flawed assumptions.” 66 Judge Redden noted that projected
survival improvements from the release of water from Brownlee Reservoir had not
materialized, undermining the agency’s reasoning, and he enjoined the Corps from
curtailing the summer spill.67 The court concluded that given the centrality of the
spill program to the 2000 BiOp’s RPA—and in the absence of any meaningful
offset—the proposed spill curtailment would result in FCRPS operations
jeopardizing ESA-listed salmon.68
The government appealed Judge Redden’s decision on the 2004 BiOp, but the
Ninth Circuit affirmed, determining that the FCRPS action agencies have
“considerable discretion” over dam operations, and that therefore the BiOp’s
failure to consider the effects of those operations on the listed salmon’s chances of
recovery violated the ESA.69 The appeals court also confirmed that the jeopardy
regulation requires analysis of both survival and recovery, including consideration
of the recovery goal as part of the inquiry into adverse modification of critical
habitat.70 Concluding that NMFS “offered no rational explanation for its decision to

Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-cv-0640-RE, 2005 WL 1398223, at *5 (D. Or. June
10, 2005), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 422 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2005).
61 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, STATEMENT OF DECISION: MODIFICATION TO SUMMER SPILL OPERATIONS FOR FISH
PASSAGE IN 2004 12–13 (2004), https://perma.cc/DND7-A7PQ.
62 Id. at 3, 5.
63 See Practicing Deception, supra note 5, at 763–64 (detailing the circumstances surrounding the
NMFS’s surprise acceptance of the proposal).
64 Id.
65 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-cv-0640-RE, 2004 WL 1698050, at *1
(D. Or. July 29, 2004).
66 Id. at *4–5. NMFS argued that the release of water from the Brownlee Reservoir to increase river
flows would help juvenile salmon migrate and would mitigate the lack of spill. Id. at *4. Judge Redden
referred to NMFS’s assumption that the water would be released at a consistent rate over twenty-one
days as “unsupportable.” Id.
67 Id. at *4–5.
68 Id.; see also Practicing Deception, supra note 5, at 766–67 (discussing the court’s conclusions).
69 NMFS III, 524 F.3d 917, 929 (9th Cir. 2008).
70 Id. at 934 (citing Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th
Cir. 2004)). In Gifford Pinchot, the Ninth Circuit noted:
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omit recovery standards from the 2004 BiOp’s analysis”—after the agency had
included recovery as part of its jeopardy analysis in both its 1995 and 2000 BiOps—
the Ninth Circuit decided that “[t]he only reasonable interpretation of the jeopardy
regulation requires NMFS to consider recovery impacts as well as survival.” 71 The
trending toward recovery standard that NMFS developed in the 2008 BiOp was a
response to this instruction.72
The failure of its appeal sent NMFS back to the jeopardy-analysis drawing
board, pursuant to Judge Redden’s order instructing the agency to “[c]orrect its
failure to consider the effects of the proposed action on both recovery and survival
of the listed species,” not solely on survival. 73 This reconsideration of jeopardy led
NMFS to develop a new metric—the trending toward recovery standard—discussed
below, which the agency began to apply to its BiOps beginning in 2008. 74 Although
the new standard acknowledged that recovery was indeed part of the jeopardy
determination, it would not survive Judge Simon’s scrutiny.
The new interpretation of jeopardy simply asked whether “[t]he populations
within a species are expected to be on a trend towards recovery.” 75 According to
NMFS, “[a]n adequate potential for recovery [meant] the listed species is on a trend
toward eventual recovery”—meaning that any increment in listed salmon returns
beyond the previous year’s returns would satisfy the recovery standard, regardless
of the size of the runs.76
Employing a combination of quantitative and qualitative measures to assess
the listed species’ recovery trend prospects, the 2008 BiOp considered average
returns-per-spawner (R/S),77 mean population growth rate (lambda), 78 and

[T]he regulatory definition reads the ‘recovery’ goal out of the adverse modification inquiry. . . . The
[agency] could authorize the complete elimination of critical habitat necessary only for recovery, and
so long as the smaller amount of critical habitat necessary for survival is not appreciably diminished,
then no ‘destruction or adverse modification,’ as defined by the regulation, has taken place. This
cannot be right. If the [agency] follows its own regulation, then it is obligated to be indifferent to, if
not to ignore, the recovery goal of critical habitat.
378 F.3d at 1069–70.
71 NMFS III, 524 F.3d at 932–33. (citing Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza–Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987)) (noting that when an agency pursues a dramatically changed administrative
approach less judicial deference is warranted); see also supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text
(discussing the drastic change in the approached adopted by the Bush Administration in 2004).
72 2008 BIOP, supra note 29, at 1-10.
73 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-cv-0640-RE, 2005 WL 2488447, at *5
(D. Or. Oct. 7, 2005), aff’d, 524 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2008).
74 2008 BIOP, supra note 29, at 1-10.
75 Id. at 7-5.
76 Id. at 1-12 (emphasis added).
77 2008 BIOP, supra note 29, at 7-4 to -5, 7-21 fig.7.1-4. Average R/S was the geometric mean of
brood year returns during 1979–2003. Id. at 7-21 to -22 & fig.7.1-4. Individual brood-year returns value
was the annual abundance of natural spawners, using an age-structure estimate. Id. at 7-23.
78 Id. at 7-21 fig.7.1-4 (estimating mean population-growth rate by converting the 1979–2003
abundance of natural spawners into a 4-year running sum, then fitting an exponential curve, the slope
of which is lambda).
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abundance trend,79 among other factors.80 In order to achieve what the court called
the “significant survival improvements necessary to avoid jeopardy,” the agency
identified specific mitigation projects from 2008–2013 as well as “broad,
unidentified categories of projects” from 2013–2018 to conclude that FCRPS
operations would likely produce no jeopardy to the listed species through 2018. 81
After the inauguration of President Obama, NMFS reconsidered and produced
a 2010 supplemental BiOp that integrated an adaptive management
implementation plan into the 2008 BiOp, including updated population metrics
indicating a decrease in salmon productivity.82 Because of a too-vague discussion of
RPA mitigation measures, Judge Redden invalidated the 2008/2010 BiOp without
enjoining hydropower operations,83 except for a continuation of the spills that he
ordered in 2005.84 Judge Redden instructed NMFS to ensure that its mitigation
measures were “reasonably specific, certain to occur, and capable of
implementation”; they had to be “subject to deadlines or otherwise-enforceable
obligations.”85
The judge did not address NMFS’s contested trending toward recovery
jeopardy standard. Instead, he struck down the BiOp primarily because of its
vagueness and the unenforceable nature of its off-site mitigation restoration plans,
which lacked the requisite specificity beyond 2013. 86 The court ordered a new BiOp
that would 1) “reevaluate[] the efficacy of the RPAs in avoiding jeopardy,” 2)
“identif[y] reasonably specific mitigation plans for the life of the biological opinion,”
and 3) “consider[] whether more aggressive action, such as dam removal and/or
additional flow augmentation and reservoir modifications are necessary to avoid
79 Id. (calculating the basinwide abundance trend as the slope of the linear regression of logtransformed time series of abundance of natural spawners during 1979–2003).
80 Id. at 7-32 to -37 (discussing qualitative factors affecting jeopardy, such as climate change,
monitoring, and adaptive management).
81 NMFS IV, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1126 (D. Or. 2011).
82 NW. REGION, NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT SECTION 7(A)(2) CONSULTATION
SUPPLEMENTAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION: SUPPLEMENTAL CONSULTATION ON REMAND FOR OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL
COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM, 11 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION PROJECTS IN THE COLUMBIA BASIN AND ESA SECTION
10(A)(I)(A) PERMIT FOR JUVENILE FISH TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM §§ 1.2, 2.1.1 (2010) (describing integration of
an adaptive management implementation plan). “For most populations, the . . . mean R/S estimates
decreased in comparison with the 2008 BiOp base period when an additional two to five years of data
were added.” Id. § 2.1.1.2.3 (citation omitted); see also Id. § 2.1.1.2.3 tbl.5 (showing updated R/S
statistics). This decline in listed salmon productivity is possible despite overall increasing fish numbers
because intense hatchery fish production adds to the overall size salmon runs. Id. § 2.1.1.2.4. But as
NMFS noted, hatchery fish are almost completely unsuccessful at returning to their spawning stream, so
the elevation of aggregate numbers does not translate to higher R/S. Id. (citing 2008 BIOP, supra note
29, at 7-24). Unfortunately, the distinction between hatchery and spawning salmon can lead to confusion
and contradictions between public perception and scientific reality. See Associated Press, Fall Chinook
Returns to Hanford Reach of Columbia River Breaks Record, OREGONIAN (Nov. 12, 2015),
https://perma.cc/LYY7-7C8W (mentioning in a caveat buried at the end of the newspaper article that
“the numbers failed to distinguish between wild salmon and hatchery-raised salmon . . . [and the]
endangered fish are wild fish”).
83 NMFS IV, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 1128, 1131. Instead, Judge Redden remanded the BiOp without
vacatur, allowing it to stay in effect through 2013. Id. at 1129.
84 Id. at 1123, 1131.
85 Id. at 1125 (quoting Ctr. for Biological Diversity v Rumsfeld, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1152 (D. Ariz.
2002)).
86 Id.
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jeopardy.”87 Because of the court’s focus on the vagueness of its RPAs, NMFS largely
retained the 2008/2010 BiOp’s jeopardy standard in its 2014 BiOp, when its
trending toward recovery standard would no longer escape judicial scrutiny.
III. THE 2014 BIOP
A coalition of environmental groups, again led by the National Wildlife
Federation, joined by the State of Oregon and the Nez Perce Tribe, challenged the
2014 BiOp.88 The remaining Columbia Basin states and tribes—who had objected to
the earlier BiOps—decided not to participate in this round of litigation. Many of
these entities chose to sign the so-called Columbia Basin Fish Accords in May 2008,
in which they agreed not to sue and instead support the federal defendants in the
suit.89 In return, they obtained $100 million per year over ten years in federally
funded projects to aid in salmon recovery.90 Some critics thought that the funds
amounted to a quid pro quo for agreeing to not sue on the 2014 BiOp. 91
Since the 2014 BiOp was a response to Judge Redden’s 2011 opinion, ruling
that the 2008/2010 BiOp failed because its mitigation was not reasonably certain
to occur,92 NMFS aimed to show that its RPAs would occur with reasonable
certainty.93 Unfortunately for the federal government, Judge Redden’s successor,
Judge Simon, took up a number of issues that his predecessor had deferred, and
most of these issues went badly for the government, especially its interpretation of
how it would factor in recovery into its RPAs. The government also fared poorly
concerning its claim of the efficacy of habitat improvements to offset the damage
from hydroelectric operations, its failure to analyze the effects of climate change
on its RPAs, and the lack of a comprehensive EIS on the cumulative effects of the
RPA’s mitigation measures on listed salmon. This Part takes up these issues.
A. The Flawed Jeopardy Standard
The 2014 BiOp continued the 2008/2010 BiOp’s trending toward recovery
standard for the recovery prong of the jeopardy analysis, under which NMFS
assessed recovery prospects quantitatively for each listed species. If the three
population-growth metrics mentioned above were all greater than 1.0—meaning
that anything above a replacement rate constituted recovery, regardless of how
87

Id. at 1130.
NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 868 n.1 (D. Or. 2016). The plaintiffs in this latest round included
those from previous litigation, and included Idaho Steelhead and Salmon United. Id.; supra note 10. The
State of Oregon joined as an intervenor-plaintiff and the Nez Perce Tribe filed an amicus curiae brief in
support of the plaintiffs. NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 868 n.1.
89 2008 Columbia Basin Fish Accords, supra note 8, at 1, 19. The parties realigned in the litigation
beginning in 2010 in the challenge to the 2008 BiOp.
90 See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
91 See, e.g., Ben Goldfarb, The Great Salmon Compromise, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Paonia, Colo.) (Dec.
8, 2014), https://perma.cc/4JBC-SEMY.
92 NMFS IV, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 1128.
93 NW. REGION, NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NWR-2013-9562, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT SECTION 7(A)(2)
SUPPLEMENTAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION: CONSULTATION ON REMAND FOR OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER
POWER SYSTEM 459–60 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 BIOP], https://perma.cc/6TR5-E892.
88
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small or gradual the growth rate—the agency considered the recovery standard
satisfied.94
But the “trending” standard failed to account for the actual abundance of
individual listed populations, despite a recommendation of NMFS’s own scientific
review team to do so.95 The Interior Columbia Technical Review Team (ICTRT),
created by NMFS and comprised of scientific experts from multiple disciplines,
established minimum viable abundance numbers for nearly all listed populations,
but the BiOp’s jeopardy analysis incorporated none of those numerical
benchmarks.96 Because the agency failed to link recovery analysis to any abundance
levels or time frames, its analysis did not, in Judge Simon’s view, satisfy the Ninth
Circuit’s prescribed “full analysis of [recovery] risks and their impacts on the listed
species’ continued existence.”97 NMFS therefore could not “logically conclude that
the RPA actions will not appreciably reduce the likelihood [of recovery].” 98
Compared to the earlier litigation over hydropower BiOps, Judge Simon’s
opinion reflected considerably more detailed and exacting judicial review.
Unsatisfied with NMFS’s ignoring the ICTRT’s abundance goals, and in response to
the agency’s claim that the plaintiffs had misrepresented the trending toward
recovery standard,99 Judge Simon emphasized that the plaintiffs were in fact
correct, and that for some fish populations, an increase of just one fish per year
could satisfy all three productivity metrics, and therefore meet NMFS’s recovery
standard.100 But he noted that the 2014 BiOp also indicated that 93.5% of the
populations in the listed evolutionary significant units (ESUs) remained in the
highest two risk categories for extinction.101 Given this evidence of the “highly
precarious status” of listed salmon,102 NMFS’s approach of requiring only
incremental improvement without accounting for populations at dangerously low

94 See supra notes 77–79 (explaining the three population indicators used to assess the recovery
prong of the jeopardy standard) A fourth metric evaluated the survival prong through a 24-year
extinction risk. 2014 BIOP, supra note 93, at 47.
95 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 891–92 (D. Or. 2016).
96 Id. at 872 & n.24. This omission occurred despite guidance in NMFS’s Consultation Handbook
which recognized that population size matters: “[T]he longer a species remains at low population levels,
the greater the probability of extinction from chance events, inbreeding depression, or additional
environmental disturbance.” U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES
CONSULTATION HANDBOOK: PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING CONSULTATION AND CONFERENCE ACTIVITIES UNDER
SECTION 7 OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 4-21 (1998) [hereinafter ESA CONSULTATION HANDBOOK]; accord
NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 891.
97 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 888 (alteration in original) (quoting NMFS III, 524 F.3d 917, 933 (9th
Cir. 2008)).
98 Id. at 894.
99 Id. at 889 (“Defendants respond that the phrase ‘one more fish per year’ is a ‘simplistic soundbite’
and will not suffice to increase the recovery metrics, which involve averages over many years, above
1.0.”).
100 Id. at 890.
101 Id. (citing 2014 BIOP, supra note 93, at 70–71 & tbl. 2.1-1). The data “shows that 65 percent of
the populations in the listed ESUs are at ‘high risk’ of extinction and 28.5 percent are at a ‘maintained’
risk of extinction (the second-highest risk category), while only 4 percent are considered ‘viable’ and 2.5
percent are considered ‘highly viable.’” Id.
102 Id. (quoting from NMFS III, 524 F.3d at 933).
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abundance levels could not, in Judge Simon’s view, rationally ensure a likelihood of
recovery.103
Relying heavily on the Ninth Circuit’s emphasis that the “highly precarious
status” of the listed species made the recovery analysis particularly critical, the
court ruled that the ESA prohibits agency action that would allow a “slow slide into
oblivion” or a tipping “from a state of precarious survival into a state of likely
extinction.”104 These possibilities increase with the length of time a species remains
at low population levels.105 The Ninth Circuit’s prescription—calling for “a full
analysis of [recovery] risks and their impacts on the listed species’ continued
existence”106—required NMFS to examine whether hydropower operations would
appreciably diminish the species’ chance of recovery, including whether the species
was “cling[ing] to survival even when recovery is far out of reach.”107 Failure to meet
this recovery standard proved fatal to the 2014 BiOp.
Judge Simon was quite critical of the metrics and data used (or not used) in
NMFS’s recovery analysis, particularly the omission of any temporal recovery endpoint in the 2008 and 2014 BiOps—in contrast to the earlier 1995 and 2000 BiOps,
which had assessed the probabilities of reaching interim recovery abundance levels
within forty-eight and one hundred years.108 Although the survival prong of the new
jeopardy analysis evaluated the risk of extinction in twenty-four years, the recovery
prong included no similar time frame. The ESA regulations draw no such
distinction,109 and NMFS failed to explain the analytical change in its jeopardy
standard from previous BiOps. 110 The government instead argued that including
abundance goals and timelines would improperly incorporate recovery plan
analysis required under section 4 of the ESA into the statute’s federal section 7
consultation analysis, but Judge Simon pointed out that the Ninth Circuit had
already rejected this argument.111 Judge Simon required at least a roughly identified
103

Id. at 891–92.
Id. at 890 (quoting NMFS III, 524 F.3d at 930, 933).
105 ESA CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 96, at 4-21. Judge Simon explained that the trending
toward recovery standard failed to consider the concerns expressed by courts and NMFS about the
dangers of sustained low abundance levels. NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 891–92. The trending toward
recovery standard omitted any consideration of the actual abundance numbers of the fish, instead
asking whether the population is growing at any detectable rate. Id. at 892. (“The problem with the
‘trending toward recovery’ standard is not that it fails to ensure that the chances of recovery are
increased, but that it does not include any metric or goal that considers whether the incremental
improvements to the currently low abundance levels are sufficient to avoid creating a ‘new risk of harm’
by decreasing the chances of recovery of the listed species.”).
106 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 888 (alteration in original) (quoting NMFS III, 524 F.3d at 933).
107 Id. at 892 (quoting NMFS III, 524 F.3d at 931).
108 Id. at 892.
109 See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2016) (definition of jeopardy, which includes “both the survival and
recovery” as parallel goals, with no distinction in the stringency of assessment required).
110 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 894–95.
111 Id. at 893 (“Requiring some attention to recovery issues does not improperly import ESA’s
separate recovery planning provisions into the section 7 consultation process. Rather, it simply provides
some reasonable assurance that the agency action in question will not appreciably reduce the odds of
success for future recovery planning, by tipping a listed species too far into danger.” (quoting NMFS III,
524 F.3d at 936)); see also Alaska v. Lubchenco, 723 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasizing that
the ultimate recovery goal must be delisting: “the goal of the ESA is not just to ensure survival, but to
ensure that the species recovers to the point that it can be delisted,” so NMFS “therefore had to consider
104
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recovery endpoint to justify NMFS’s conclusion that RPA actions will not appreciably
diminish the likelihood of reaching the recovery goal. 112
The ESA expressly requires agency decisions to be made based on the “best
scientific . . . data available.”113 More than his predecessors, Judge Simon immersed
himself in the details of the scientific quantitative analysis, finding unacceptable
unexplained omissions or divergences from the recommendations of scientific
experts. For example, NMFS had the ICTRT’s minimum viable abundance numbers
available since 2008, even listing them in tables in both the 2008 and 2014 BiOps. 114
But the agency failed to use them in setting recovery goals. 115 NMFS also ignored
the advice of its own biologists about what was the best available science to inform
the recovery analysis.116 Finally, the agency failed to explain the dramatic change in
the recovery prong of the jeopardy standard from the 1995 and 2000 BiOps—which
Judge Redden and Ninth Circuit had cited with approval117—to the 2008 and 2014
BiOps.118
Judge Simon noted the agency’s failure to explain this abrupt shift 119 and, in
the absence of an explanation, refused to defer to the agency’s new interpretation
of the jeopardy standard.120 Because the agency ignored its scientific advisors
without explanation and failed to link recovery metrics to abundance levels or time

whether the proposed action, continued fishing, could prevent the species from achieving the [recovery]
goals for delisting”).
112 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 894.
113 ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).
114 2014 BIOP, supra note 93, at 210–11 tbls.2.2-3, 2.2-4 & 2.2-5; 2008 BIOP, supra note 29, at 7-7,
8.10-14 tbl.8.10.2.1-4.
115 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 872 (“[T]he methodology [NMFS] employs essentially ignores [the
ICTRT’s] findings without explanation.”).
116 Id. at 894 (citing an email from Chris Toole, the ESA section 7 coordinator in the NMFS Northwest
Regional Office, which noted that “to assess a ‘trend towards recovery,’ with meaningful metrics, one
must have some idea of what constitutes recovery. The tables assume that [ICTRT’s] recommendations
represent the best available scientific information relative to the ESUs most affected in the remand.”).
117 Id. at 895 (citing NMFS III, 524 F.3d 917, 932–33 (9th Cir. 2008), and NMFS II, No. 3:01-cv-0640RE, 2005 WL 1278878, at *17 (D. Or. May 26, 2005), aff’d, 524 F.3d 917, 938 (9th Cir. 2008)).
118 Id. at 894 (“[I]n the 2008 and 2014 BiOps, [NMFS] did not follow its standards set forth in the
1995 and 2000 BiOps because [NMFS] dropped consideration of whether the agency action will
appreciably reduce the likelihood of recovery by assessing the actions’ impact on the probabilities of
reaching interim recovery abundance levels in 48 and 100 years.”).
119 Id. (citing Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082,
1091 (9th Cir. 2005)).
120 Id. at 894–95 (citing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012) and
NMFS III, 524 F.3d at 933) (“Because the agency again has dramatically changed its approach, its latest
interpretation of the jeopardy standard is entitled to less deference than a court normally gives.”). The
government argued unsuccessfully for deference to its scientific expertise, citing Northwest Ecosystem
Alliance v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 475 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2007) for the proposition that
“interpretation of complex genetic data falls within the domain of the Service’s scientific discretion, to
which we must defer so long as the Service has articulated a rational basis for its conclusion.” Federal
Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion and
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motions for Summary Judgment at 19, NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d 861 (No. 3:01cv-0640-SI), ECF No. 2001 (quoting Nw. Ecosystem All., 475 F.3d at 1150). But Judge Simon decided
deference would not have saved NMFS’s interpretation. NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 895 (“Even applying
deference, however, for the reasons discussed above, the Court finds NOAA Fisheries’ ‘trending toward
recovery’ standard to be arbitrary and capricious.”).
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frames, it could not rationally conclude that the RPAs would avoid appreciably
reducing listed species’ chance of recovery. Its use of the trending toward recovery
standard therefore violated the ESA.121
B. Using Habitat Mitigation to Offset Hydropower Losses
In remanding the 2008/2010 BiOp because of a lack of enforceability of its
RPAs, Judge Redden did not rule on the jeopardy standard and its underlying
scientific methodology. Instead, he focused on the capability of the BiOp’s
mitigation measures to offset the adverse effects of federal hydropower
operations.122 He decided that NMFS’s reliance on habitat mitigation measures that
were not specific or certain to occur made its no jeopardy decision arbitrary and
capricious, calling it “simply [a] promise to figure it all out in the future.” 123
To comply with the court’s 2011 remand order, 124 NMFS aimed to produce a
2014 BiOp with “more specific identification of habitat mitigation projects for the
2014 through 2018 period.”125 Consequently, the agency revised its jeopardy
analysis, buttressing it with specific habitat mitigation projects it identified for
implementation during 2014 through 2018.126 But Judge Simon decided that the
benefits of these habitat mitigation projects continued to be too uncertain to satisfy
the ESA requirement of giving the “benefit of the doubt” to the endangered
species.127 Citing previous case law on FCRPS BiOps, Judge Simon concluded that
NMFS failed again to ensure that its mitigation measures were “reasonably specific,
certain to occur, and capable of implementation” and “subject to deadlines or
otherwise-enforceable obligations” in order to justify the no jeopardy conclusion of
the BiOp.128 He emphasized both NMFS’s use of faulty survival metrics and the
agency’s overestimates of the benefits of estuarine and tributary habitat
improvements.

121

NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 895.
NMFS IV, 839 F. Supp. 2d. 1117, 1127 (D. Or. 2011).
123 Id. at 1128.
124 Id. at 1128–29 (“For the reasons above, I find that the no jeopardy decision for the entire tenyear term of the BiOp is arbitrary and capricious because NOAA Fisheries has failed to identify specific
mitigation plans beyond 2013, that are reasonably certain to occur. Because the 2008/2010 BiOp
provides some protection for listed species through 2013, however, I order NOAA Fisheries to fund and
implement the BiOp until then.”).
125 2014 BIOP, supra note 93, at 33.
126 Id.
127 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 900 (D. Or. 2016) (citing Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1386
(9th Cir. 1987), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 789 F.3d 1075, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015)); see also id. at 903 (quoting Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric
Admin. Fisheries, Responses to Comments from the Sovereign Review of the 2013 Draft Supplemental
Biological Opinion 33 (Jan. 17, 2014), https://perma.cc/2YGA-3HEL); id. at 906 (citing NMFS IV, 839 F.
Supp. 2d at 1128) (criticizing NMFS’s decision to count all habitat mitigation benefits as accrued
immediately upon project completion, when in reality those benefits could take years to materialize).
128 Id. at 873 (citing NMFS III, 524 F.3d 917, 935–36 (9th Cir. 2007), and NMFS IV, 839 F. Supp. 2d at
1125).
122
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1. Survival Metrics
Judge Simon was heavily influenced by NMFS’s poor track record
demonstrating the jeopardy-avoiding benefits of existing habitat programs. The
agency had not, since the 2008 BiOp, revised its no jeopardy finding or reconsidered
the efficacy of the off-site habitat RPAs, alleging that productivity in recent years
was “within the expectations of the 2008 BiOp.” 129 Judge Simon, however, noted
that a key survival and recovery metric in the 2014 BiOp—R/S130—already was
showing a decline.131 NMFS attempted to explain this downturn as falling within the
95% confidence intervals established by the 2008 BiOp—intervals that Judge Simon
decided were “so broad, that falling within them is essentially meaningless.” 132
Although the judge acknowledged that such wide confidence intervals may be
unavoidable, he ruled that they could not “be used as a shield in the 2014 BiOp
against the need for further analysis and possible changes in the RPA actions when
the underlying assumptions on which the 2008 BiOp’s no jeopardy conclusion was
based are not coming to fruition.”133
NMFS claimed that observations of high spawner abundance, coupled with
low productivity (low R/S), were consistent with interference of competition for
resources that occurs at high population abundance in a small area (“densitydependent mortality”), a well-established phenomenon in Pacific salmonids. 134
Density-dependent mortality is one explanation for the RPA not realizing its
expected productivity returns because, according to NMFS, the time constraints of
the 2010 remand did not allow for analyzing these factors in detail.135 This
explanation failed to convince Judge Simon, who considered the agency’s selective
invocation of density dependence as a transparent attempt to “have it both ways”;
that is, not considering the detrimental effects of density dependence on survival
benefits and productivity increases but instead using it to excuse a decreasing R/S
trend.136 Judge Simon concluded that the agency failed to provide a rational
129

2014 BIOP, supra note 93, at 113–19.
See supra note 77 (discussing this metric).
131 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 886–87.
132 Id. at 873, 899 (noting that, for example, the Yankee Fork population “could, in one generation,
be declining by nearly three-fourths or increasing by nearly one-third, and both would fall within the 2008
BiOp’s wide confidence intervals”).
133 Id. at 899.
134 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 922–923 (citing RICH ZABEL ET AL., LIFE-CYCLE MODELS OF SALMONID
POPULATIONS IN THE INTERIOR COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 35 (2013)); 2014 BIOP, supra note 93, at 67. Densitydependence refers to the inverse relationship between population density and population growth rate
that can develop when a habitat’s carrying capacity is exceeded and competition for scarce food and
space takes over. INDEP. SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR THE NW. POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL ET AL., ISAB 2015-1,
DENSITY DEPENDENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR FISH MANAGEMENT AND RESTORATION PROGRAMS IN THE COLUMBIA
RIVER BASIN 25 (2015) [hereinafter ISAB REPORT 2015-1], https://perma.cc/JW6Z-TFFD (“Evidence of
strong density dependence at abundances lower than historical levels suggests that carrying capacity
has been reduced. Density dependence . . . is also critical for enhancing the stability of natural
populations.”).
135 2014 BIOP, supra note 93, at 67. For further NMFS analysis of density-dependent mortality, see
id. app D.
136 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 901 (“NOAA Fisheries thus relies on the fact that density dependence
is occurring during the time period of the BiOp to disregard the decline in R/S, while at the same time
refusing to consider the negative effects of density dependence when calculating the survival estimates
130
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explanation for its disregard of the decline in R/S, a metric it had described in the
2008 BiOp as the “most realistic” assessment of the likelihood of recovery. 137
2. Estuary and Tributary Habitat Improvements
To provide a quantitative assessment of survival benefits habitat actions in the
estuary, the Expert Regional Technical Group (ERTG)—comprised of regional
scientists with relevant estuarine ecology and fisheries biology expertise—scored
each RPA project using the so-called “survival benefit units” (SBUs) method, which
the agency updated in the 2014 BiOp. 138 ERTG’s scoring in the 2008 and 2014 BiOps
indicated that the increase in survival benefit necessary to avoid jeopardy was thirty
SBUs for stream-type fish and forty-five SBUs for ocean-type fish, requiring
improvements of about 6% and 9%, respectively.139
Judge Simon thought that the agency’s effort to provide specific, numerical
survival benefits of habitat actions “does not allay the concern expressed by Judge
Redden” about the uncertainty of survival benefits, because NMFS’s own scientists,
as they had in the 2008 BiOp, expressed skepticism about the uncertainties in the
scoring.140 In light of the litany of suggestions made by the Independent Scientific
Advisory Board (ISAB) to improve the scientific soundness of the ERTG scoring
process, Judge Simon was not satisfied by NMFS’s “conclusory statement” that the
ERTG applied the best available science.141 Without a reasonable explanation of the

and prospective productivity increases relied on as accruing within the time frame of the BiOp. These
positions are inconsistent— if the best available science shows that density dependence is occurring
within the 10-year time frame of the BiOp, then density dependence should be considered in analyzing
the estimated survival improvements and prospective productivity increases, but if the best available
science shows that density dependence is not occurring during the BiOp time frame, then it cannot be
relied on to explain the decrease in R/S. NOAA Fisheries cannot have it both ways.”)
137 Id. at 887 (“NOAA Fisheries has described average R/S as ‘the most realistic assessment of the
likelihood that a population will trend toward recovery in the absence of continued hatchery
programs . . . because th[is] metric considers only the survival of natural-origin fish.’” (alterations in
original) (citation omitted)). According to Judge Simon, NMFS was not entitled to judicial deference
because NMFS, at a minimum,
should have should have explained why these positions are not inconsistent or, if they are
inconsistent, why it is not arbitrary and capricious to treat density dependence differently in the
context where it would have negative effects than in the context where it is relied on to explainaway the fact that improvements relied-upon in the no jeopardy conclusion are not being
realized.
Id. at 901.
138 Id. at 902; 2014 BIOP, supra note 93, at 326.
139 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 902; BIOP, supra note 93, at 326.
140 Id. at 903–04 (emphasizing that the Independent Scientific Advisory Board (ISAB) considered
ERTG’s new scoring process to be “partially based on sound science” with low statistical accuracy and
precision, reducing it to an “informed hypotheses,” rather than a rigorous assessment). ISAB also made
numerous suggestions as to how the ERTG scoring process could be improved, which ERTG ignored and
NMFS did not explain. Id.
141 Id. at 904. ISAB’s members are appointed by a majority vote of the chair of the Northwest Power
Planning Council, the Regional Administrator of NMFS, and a senior tribal representative. Indep. Sci.
Advisory Bd., Terms of Reference 3–4 (July 15, 2004), https://perma.cc/FN9K-UGA9. Candidates must
meet strict criteria and may not be salaried employees of the Council, the tribes, NMFS, or be a member
of the Selection Panel. Id. at 5. By contrast, ERTG is comprised of five scientists associated with NMFS,
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discrepancies between the ERTG scoring and the ISAB’s recommendations, Judge
Simon rejected the government’s argument that the court should defer to the
expert judgment of the ERTG.142
NMFS also maintained that survival improvements could not be proven with
absolute certainty.143 Judge Simon discussed this aspect of uncertainty in
substantial detail, troubled by a lack of any “cushion”—or margin of safety—to
account for project failures, which could improperly impose risk on the listed
species.144 Because NMFS, ERTG, and other scientists agreed that the survival
benefit estimation is “rife with uncertainty,” and since NMFS acknowledged that
benefits assumed to be instantaneous in the SBU calculation may in fact take years
to achieve, the judge thought that omitting any margin for error in the number of
required SBUs was “neither cautious nor rational.”145 Judge Simon cited the
Supreme Court’s 1978 recognition of Congress’ decision to give endangered species
national priority, which characterized the ESA’s as a “policy of institutionalized
caution,”146 in reaching his conclusion that NMFS must include a margin for error in
its RPA mitigation measures in order to give the benefit of the doubt to the listed
species.147
In addition to the uncertainty over alleged survival benefits of the off-site
habitat measures, NMFS’s track record inspired no judicial confidence that the RPAs
were reasonably certain to occur. According to Judge Simon, “[t]he estuary program
has not only failed to catch up in the four years since the 2010 Supplemental BiOp,
but has fallen further behind.”148 Six years into the ten-year 2008 BiOp’s time frame,
he cited considerable evidence that the estuary-habitat mitigation actions were not
on track for completion by 2018.149

the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife, the Skagit
River System Cooperative, and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN. &
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, SCIENCE AND THE EVALUATION OF HABITAT RESTORATION PROJECTS IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER
ESTUARY: THE EXPERT REGIONAL TECHNICAL GROUP PROCESS 5 (2013), https://perma.cc/D7C6-NWRS.
142 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 904. (“[NMFS] may not, however, make general assertions that it
applied the ‘best available science’ and deserves deference without providing a reasonable explanation
and addressing the fact that independent scientists have repeatedly expressed skepticism regarding the
specific, numeric survival benefits assigned to habitat mitigation.”).
143 Id.
144 Id. at 905 n.71.
145 Id. at 905–06 (quoting in the second quotation NMFS IV, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1128 (D. Or.
2011)).
146 Id. at 906 (citing Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (“Congress has spoken in the
plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording
endangered species the highest of priorities, thereby adopting a policy which it described as
‘institutionalized caution.’”)).
147 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 906.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 906–07 (noting that thirty-eight of forty-three estuary projects had not been scored by the
ERTG, and only two were in the final planning phase). With only 18% and 11% of the ocean- and streamtype fish-survival improvements implemented more than halfway through the BiOp period, Judge Simon
thought it was not rational to conclude that action agencies were on track to meet the BiOp’s goals. Id.
at 906. Judge Simon described in detail the breakdown of negotiations on one project that represented
more than 41% of the stream-type survival benefits, and the lack of any replacement project to make up
for this loss. Id. at 907 n.72. Such failures undermined NMFS’s claim that its mitigation measures were
“reasonably certain to occur.” Id. at 908 (quoting NMFS III, 524 F.3d 917, 935–36 (9th Cir. 2007)).
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Tributary-habitat actions also contributed survival benefits on which NMFS
relied for its no jeopardy conclusion.150 As with the estuary-habitat actions, Judge
Simon decided that the BiOp’s reliance on numeric survival benefits of tributary
projects was, given the scientific uncertainty, inconsistent with the ESA’s
requirement that the “risk . . . should not fall on the listed species.” 151 Given this
uncertainty, the agency inappropriately omitted any “cushion” of excess RPA
actions that would provide a margin for error in these expected survival benefits. 152
As of 2011 (four years into the ten-year BiOp time frame), tributary projects
appeared on track for only forty-eight of the affected fifty-six populations,153 which
the plaintiffs claimed showed that government was behind schedule, but which
NMFS addressed in the 2014 BiOp by enumerating additional supplemental
tributary habitat actions.154
Despite these worries, Judge Simon did defer to NMFS concerning tributary
mitigation. He did so based on the action agencies’ “extensive track record of
success” and the fact that, as compared to estuary-habitat projects, most tributary
projects were farther along in development, with a larger fraction approved
through expert review.155 For example, the Nez Perce Tribe raised concerns about
the timing of needed supplemental tributary habitat actions in light of the required
of panel evaluation and availability of funding, but Judge Simon decided that NMFS
addressed these concerns with a rational explanation of why the supplemental
tributary projects remained reasonably certain to occur.156
The court’s evaluation of tributary-habitat measures to avoid jeopardy of the
Catherine Creek and Yankee Fork salmon populations were two exceptions to the
court’s deference. In the former, NMFS stated that action agencies would resolve
an 8% shortfall in habitat improvement by “identify[ing] additional actions based
on” assessment tools “in development.”157 Judge Simon rejected this claim as “little
more than the ‘sincere general commitment’ of the Action Agencies,” a position
which the Ninth Circuit earlier stated was insufficient. 158 With respect to the Yankee
Fork population, Judge Simon expressed concern with NMFS’s “pattern of

150

Id. at 911, 949.
Id. at 910 (citing Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978)).
152 Id. at 909–10 (observing that for estuary-habitat actions, by contrast, NMFS enumerated specific
SBUs required to avoid jeopardy and identified the SBUs that it expected the RPAs to achieve, with the
latter exceeding the former, providing a cushion of excess survival benefits).
153 Id. at 910 (noting that projects had achieved more than 33% of required habitat quality
improvements by 2011 meet performance standards); 2014 BiOp, supra note 93, at 269–70.
154 Appendix B of the Implementation Plan listed specific, quantitative supplemental habitat quality
improvement measures such as the Umatilla Tribes’ improving flow in the upper Grande Ronde River by
14 cubic feet per second, to address the seven populations referenced in the 2014 BiOp as “not projected
to meet their HQI performance standard without an increase in the pace and/or focus of action
implementation.” NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER
SYSTEM: 2014–2018 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN app. B at 279–83, https://perma.cc/CSE2-BMRM; 2014 BIOP,
supra note 93, at 282.
155 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 911 & n.73.
156 Id. at 911–12. (“NOAA Fisheries did consider the Nez Perce Tribe’s timing and funding concerns
and offered a reasonable explanation for its conclusion that those issues will not prevent the
supplemental tributary projects from being reasonably certain to occur.”).
157 See 2014 BIOP, supra note 93, at 289.
158 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 913 (quoting NMFS III, 524 F.3d 917, 935–36 (9th Cir. 2007)).
151
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discounting pessimistic information” from expert panels, citing selective use of data
in reaching conclusions about the population by NMFS in its 2008 and 2014
BiOps.159
Despite these worries, Judge Simon decided that NMFS adequately explained
the 2014 BiOp’s conclusion that the necessary habitat improvements would be
achieved before 2018 “under the deferential standard of a Section 7 consultation
review.”160 He concluded that the flaw in the 2014 BiOp was not its reliance on offsite habitat mitigation projects per se but instead the fact that some RPA projects
or their survival benefits were insufficiently certain to occur to avoid jeopardy,
making NMFS’s reliance on those survival benefits arbitrary.161 Judge Simon
reiterated that the ESA requires the risk of failure of mitigation to not fall on the
species, and that habitat improvement projects must achieve “some amount of
survival benefit beyond the minimum survival benefit.” 162 In short, the listed salmon
should not shoulder the burden of uncertainty.
C. Effects of Climate Change on Mitigation Measures
Because the best available science indicated that climate change would have
a detrimental future effect on listed populations, NMFS had to adequately assess
the adverse effects of climate change in its BiOp. 163 Judge Simon concluded that
NMFS had failed to do so, since the BiOp lacked any assessment of how climate
change might diminish or eliminate the effectiveness of its habitat-mitigation RPAs
and ignored the expert assessment of ISAB concerning future ocean temperature
scenarios.164
The 2014 BiOp considered quantitative effects of climate change on ocean
conditions, using scenarios modeled for the 2008 BiOp, but it relied only on
qualitative assessments for freshwater climate change effects.165 In considering “a
reasonable range of future ocean survivals” to assess the effects of climate change
on Columbia Basin salmon extinction risk and productivity, the 2008 BiOp evaluated
three future climate scenarios. 166 The 2014 BiOp included updated climate data,

159

Id.
Id.
161 Id. at 914.
162 Id.
163 Id. (“Climate change effects that have harmful impacts to certain of the listed species include:
warmer stream temperatures; warmer ocean temperatures; contracting ocean habitat; contracting
inland habitat; degradation of estuary habitat; reduced spring and summer stream flows with increased
peak river flows; large-scale ecological changes, such as increasing insect infestations and fires affecting
forested lands; increased rain with decreased snow; diminishing snow-packs; increased flood flows; and
increased susceptibility to fish pathogens and parasites, organisms that are generally not injurious to
their host until the fish becomes thermally stressed.”).
164 Id. at 917 (“NOAA Fisheries’ analysis does not apply the best available science, overlooks
important aspects of the problem, and fails properly to analyze the effects of climate change, including
its additive harm, how it may reduce the effectiveness of the RPA actions, particularly habitat actions
that are not expected to achieve full benefits for ‘decades,’ and how it increases the chances of a
catastrophic event.”).
165 Id. at 915.
166 See 2014 BIOP, supra note 93, at 152.
160
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including decreased streamflows and increased in average tributary and mainstem
temperatures, which augured worsening effects on salmon.167
In the 2014 BiOp, NMFS announced that “while additional details regarding
observed and forecasted effects of climate change on Pacific Northwest salmonids
have become available in recent years, the effects remain consistent with those
described in the 2008 BiOp.”168 This statement, and a later comment that “new
projections of the effects of ocean warming on salmon marine distributions are an
example of an effect generally considered in the 2008 BiOp, but which new
information indicates may be greater than previously anticipated,” 169 called into
question whether NMFS had adequately addressed the possible effects of climate
change. The plaintiffs characterized NMFS’s approach to climate change analysis as
“irrational exuberance,”170 not the “institutionalized caution” required by the
ESA.171
Judge Simon found troubling NMFS’s emphasis on claims that the new climate
information presented “continue[d] to be within the range of assumptions
considered in the 2008 BiOp and 2010 Supplemental BiOp” because this reliance
implied that consistency with prior expectations obviated the need for deeper
inquiry.172 Consequently, Judge Simon decided that NMFS’s cursory analysis of the
effects of climate change in the 2014 BiOp was not “complete, reasoned, [or]
adequately explained” and failed to apply the best available science by fully
analyzing the additive harm of climate change.173
A prominent example of the agency’s failure to analyze additive harm was its
omission to consider whether the effectiveness of the RPA actions could be reduced
by climate change. Because RPA habitat restoration measures aimed to improve the
same freshwater streamflow and temperature variables that climate change will
adversely affect, climate change could diminish or even overtake these promised
habitat restoration benefits. Despite the prospect that climate change may negate
the effectiveness of some habitat mitigation efforts, NMFS failed to assess this
possibility and instead assumed that climate conditions would remain the same for
the purposes of the jeopardy analysis. 174
Judge Simon faulted this premise of no change in the climate as short-sighted.
He pointed out that the survival prong of the jeopardy analysis estimated a twentyfour-year extinction risk, requiring a longer time-horizon than the ten-year time
167 Id. at 160–62 & figs. 2.1-37 to -38 (decreased streamflows); id. at 163–67 & figs.2.1-39 to -41
(increased temperatures).
168 Id. at 168.
169 Id. at 178.
170 Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion and Memorandum, Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine
Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-cv-0640-SI (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2014) at 1, 33 [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Brief].
171 Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 170, at 17 (citing Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir.
1987)).
172 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 916 & n.77 (D. Or. 2016) (quoting 2014 BIOP, supra note 93, at 179).
173 Id. at 874 (citing Nw. Coal. for Alts. to Pesticides v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 544 F.3d 1043, 1052
n.7) (9th Cir. 2008) (“NOAA Fisheries’ analysis does not apply the best available science, overlooks
important aspects of the problem, and fails properly to analyze the effects of climate change, including
its additive harm, how it may reduce the effectiveness of the RPA actions, particularly habitat actions
that are not expected to achieve full benefits for ‘decades,’ and how it increases the chances of a
catastrophic event.”).
174 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 917–18.
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frame of the BiOps.175 Expanding this time horizon would surely result in an analytic
period encompassing worsening ocean conditions, rather than the “recent” ocean
conditions base period on which NMFS based its no jeopardy conclusion. 176 The
agency failed to explain its omission of the “warm” ocean scenario, likely to be more
representative of future climate conditions.177 Moreover, the 2014 BiOp’s assertion
that worsening ocean conditions was “unlikely to apply to the period of the
Prospective Actions” contradicted the agency’s evaluation of the potential failure
of recovery under the warm ocean scenario in its 2008 BiOp. 178 This inconsistency,
along with an insufficient explanation of why NMFS ignored ISAB’s expert advice,
was the quintessence of arbitrary decision making, according to Judge Simon.179
Claiming that climate change would not diminish the effectiveness of the RPAs,
NMFS also maintained that the RPAs were consistent with ISAB-recommended
actions to mitigate climate change, effectively double-counting some existing RPA
actions to both mitigate any negative effects of climate change and offset adverse
habitat modifications due to hydropower operations. 180 Judge Simon found the
agency’s treatment of climate change effects unconvincing to the point of
disingenuity, noting that confining its analysis to the BiOp time frame (on the
ground that there was too much uncertainty after 2018) was inconsistent with the
fact that a meaningful recovery analysis required consideration of climate effects
well beyond the BiOp period.181 NMFS’s selective invocation of uncertainty to justify
not applying new scientific results on the climate change effects of recovery
prospects violated the ESA’s requirement of using the best scientific data
available.182
Judge Simon illustrated his concern about NMFS’s “inconsistent treatment of
scientific uncertainty” with several examples, chief among them the failure to
conduct any quantitative analysis of climate effects on freshwater life stages of

175

Id. at 918.
Id. at 918–19.
177 Id. at 919 (the ISAB commented that even this warm scenario “may not be pessimistic enough”).
178 Id. at 919 (quoting 2008 BIOP, supra note 29, at 7-13).
179 Id. at 921–22 (“NOAA Fisheries listed significant additional quantitative and qualitative
information and then summarily concluded that all of the new information was included in the 2008
BiOp’s assumptions and expectations. . . . Scientifically-sound consideration of climate impacts requires
more than that.”).
180 Id. at 916–17. Judge Simon’s discussion of individual examples of the effects of climate change
on RPA effectiveness exemplified his close judicial review. For example, he noted that to offset the
adverse effects of dam operations, the action agencies have used cold water releases from Dworshak
Dam to augment mainstem flows during juvenile migration seasons. Id. at 920. However, the 2014 BiOp
employed similar releases to reduce mortality from high water temperatures, an effect of climate
change. NMFS did not analyze whether Dworshak has the capacity for a sufficient number and
magnitude of releases necessary to address both types of harms. Id.
181 See id. at 920–21 (noting that the 1995 and 2000 BiOps’ recovery analysis evaluated effects
twenty years beyond the BiOp period).
182 See id. at 921 (observing that in the 2014 BiOp, NMFS relied on “numerous analytical tools and
methodologies that are not scientifically certain, some of which have much less scientific data available
than does climate change”); ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2012) (requiring that endangerment
determinations be made on the basis of “the best scientific and commercial data available” (emphasis
added)).
176
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salmonids, despite a burgeoning scientific literature.183 Given the specter of a
“catastrophic event that can quickly imperil” listed species, Judge Simon did not
consider NMFS’s broad and general analysis to be “complete, reasoned, and
adequately explained.”184 After a close review of the new scientific information that
NMFS “merely recited,”185 Simon decided that the BiOp’s climate change analysis
was “insufficient, not based on the best available science, and inconsistent with
how [NMFS] analyzed climate change” in the another similar BiOp. 186 In short, the
agency failed to properly evaluate the degree to which climate change could reduce
the effectiveness of the RPAs and thus affect the jeopardy analysis.
D. Effects on Designated Critical Habitat
The ESA forbids any federal action likely to result in “destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of [listed] species which is determined by the Secretary,
after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical.”187 The statute
defines “critical habitat” as areas with physical or biological features that are
“essential to the conservation” of listed species. 188 NMFS designated critical habitat
for twelve of the thirteen listed species affected by Columbia Basin dam
operations.189 Judge Simon interpreted the agency’s regulatory definition of the
statutory language forbidding the destruction or adverse modification of critical
habitat to require “improvement to the point of delisting,” referring to a Ninth

183 Id. at 920–21. & n.81. The plaintiffs pointed out NMFS’s strategy to insulate itself from analyzing
or acting on new evidence by declaring it to be “detail”; they cited examples where these “new details”
actually represented abrupt changes from previous understanding, such as contractions of the ocean
range for all species of salmon by 2080. Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 170, at 35–36. Judge Simon concluded
that “scientifically-sound consideration of climate impacts required more than” 1) general statements
of possible effects of climate, 2) quantitative analysis that assumed base-period climate rather than any
warming, and 3) qualitative analysis that merely assessed whether RPA actions were “consistent with”
the ISAB’s recommendations for the types of actions that might ameliorate climate change. NMFS V, 184
F. Supp. 3d at 921–23.
184 Id. at 922–23.
185 Id. at 920.
186 Id. at 923. Judge Simon also mentioned the Central Valley Project (CVP) BiOp. Id. In 2009, NMFS
developed procedures and an operational plan for CVP for eight dams, pumping stations, and hatcheries
that explicitly included climate change as part of the future baseline. SW. REGION, NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES
SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION AND CONFERENCE OPINION ON THE LONG-TERM OPERATIONS OF THE CENTRAL VALLEY
PROJECT AND STATE WATER PROJECT 43, 172 (2009). Five region-specific future climate scenarios
demonstrated the sensitivity of future operations to potential climate and sea level conditions through
2030. Id. at 172. NMFS saw this as the best way to fulfill its court-directed responsibility to “consider the
effects of climate change on the species and critical habitat and our prediction of the future impacts of
a proposed action.” Id. at 43.
187 ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).
188 Id. § 1532(5)(A).
189 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 929 n.89. The designated critical habitat for listed Columbia Basin
salmon includes the juvenile and adult migration corridors of the Snake and Columbia Rivers. Id. at 929;
Endangered and Threatened Species; Designation of Critical Habitat for Lower Columbia River Coho
Salmon and Puget Sound Steelhead, 78 Fed. Reg. 2,726, 2,732 (Jan. 14, 2013). NMFS concluded that “safe
passage” through this migratory corridor was among the primary constituent elements of this critical
habitat. NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 929 (quoting the 2008 BIOP, supra note 29, at 3-5 to -6 & tbl.3.2-1).
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Circuit decision that adverse modification includes any adverse effects on recovery
due to alterations of critical habitat.190
The regulatory requirement that NMFS must analyze effects on both survival
and recovery of adverse modification of salmon migration corridors was a major
controversy in the case. The agency evaluated critical habitat to determine whether
the habitat “is likely to . . . retain the ability to become functional.”191 In a confusing
portion of his ruling, Judge Simon decided that although this standard failed to
comply with the ESA, he nevertheless ruled the BiOp’s critical habitat analysis was
“not irrational” or in clear error because of “significant improvements” in mainstem
habitat.192
In contrast to his careful analysis of the jeopardy standard, Judge Simon’s
discussion of critical habitat was quite cursory. The judge declared NMFS’s standard
of “retain[ing] the current ability to become functional” to be inconsistent with the
ESA.193 He pointed out that the mainstem migration corridors were degraded,
dysfunctional, and failing to fulfill their conservation role—as acknowledged by
NMFS194—and explained that asking “whether the RPA allows this degraded habitat
to retain its current ability to someday become functional” failed to comply with
the ESA’s directive.195 Judge Simon decided that the standard failed to comply with
the ESA because it would not suffice in a situation like the mainsteam Columbia and
Snake Rivers, where the degraded habitat was not serving its conservation role.196
Despite the agency’s reliance on this flawed standard, Judge Simon concluded
that NMFS’s analysis of adverse modification of critical habitat did “more than just
permit the status quo,”197 and thus was “not irrational or in clear error.”198 Simon’s
reasoning—that a simple trajectory of improvement sufficed—appeared to be
inconsistent with his earlier conclusion that the trending toward recovery jeopardy
standard was inconsistent with the statute.199 In both cases, NMFS argued that any
change in the right direction complied with the ESA. Curiously, the agency
succeeded with this argument in the critical habitat context where it had failed in
the jeopardy context.
Judge Simon upheld NMFS’s critical habitat analysis because the BiOp included
measures beyond those the standard required, “includ[ing] significant
190 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 929 (construing 50 C.F.R. § 402.02) (citing Gifford Pinchot Task Force
v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004)). Destruction or adverse modification is
defined as “a direct or indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat for both
the survival and recovery of a listed species.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2016).
191 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 930 (quoting 2008 BIOP, supra note 29, at 1-10).
192 Id. at 930, 933.
193 Id. at 930 (citing Nez Perce Tribe v. Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. Fisheries, No. CV–07–
247–N–BLW, 2008 WL 938430, at *8 (D. Idaho Apr. 7, 2008)) (“Maintaining the status quo when there is
severely degraded habitat that does not serve its conservation role and will be adversely modified unless
changes are made to FCRPS operations does not suffice.”).
194 Id. (citing 2008 BIOP, supra note 29, at 3-7).
195 Id.
196 Id. (noting that the cases defendants cite in support of this standard are situations where current
habitat is functional).
197 See id. at 930–31 (“The RPA need not restore habitat to a fully functioning level, but it must at
least include improvements sufficient to avoid the adverse modification of the FCRPS.”).
198 Id. at 933.
199 See supra notes 108–121 and accompanying text.
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improvements.”200 NMFS listed mainstem improvements in the 2008 BiOp,201 and
the 2014 BiOp maintained that the RPA actions would “substantially improv[e] the
functioning of many” primary constituent elements of the critical habitat. 202
Although Judge Simon was “concerned” about the failure of NMFS to establish a
quantitative recovery level, he cited modeling that predicted “quantifiable
improvements” to juvenile salmon passage in upholding NMFS’s conclusion that the
BiOp would not adversely modify designated critical habitat. 203 This result seems
inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit’s admonition that critical habitat designations
must include sufficient habitat to promote species recovery.204 In fact, the appeals
court has made it quite clear that the critical habitat standard requires more
protection for recovery than for avoiding jeopardy, 205 but Judge Simon seemed to
adopt a more lenient approach206
E. Requiring an EIS on ESA Implementation
A novel element in the 2014 BiOp litigation was the claim that the action
agencies, especially the Corps, BPA, and the Bureau of Reclamation, failed to
comply with NEPA.207 Although implementation of the BiOp required the action
agencies to undertake NEPA procedures concerning their implementation of RPA
measures,208 the agencies undertook no program-wide NEPA analysis on the 2014
BiOp’s implementation.209 Instead, the action agencies claimed to have complied
200

NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 931.
Id. at 932–33 (citing 2008 BIOP, supra note 29, at 8.2-31, 8.3-46, 8.4-23, 8.5-49, 8.6-33, 8.7-43,
8.8-46, 8.10-52, 8.12-33).
202 Id. (citing 2014 BIOP, supra note 25, at 477).
203 Id. at 932–33. The discussion that satisfied Judge Simon included mentions of prospective RPA
actions to improve surface passage at mainstem dams and adjusting spill to avoid avian predators, such
as cormorants. Id. at 932. Judge Simon recently ruled that although the Corps violated NEPA by failing
to consider alternatives before deciding to kill the birds, the killing could continue because it helps
threatened and endangered fish, adopting the reasoning that the endangered species gets the “benefit
of the doubt.” Audubon Soc’y of Portland v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 3:15-cv-665-SI, 2016 WL
4577009, at *13, *16 (D. Or. Aug. 31, 2016); see also Cassandra Profita, Court Rules Corps Can Continue
Killing Cormorants, EARTHFIX (Sept. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/B2JB-ZTZF.
204 Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004).
205 Id. at 1069 (“[I]t is logical and inevitable that a species requires more critical habitat for recovery
than is necessary for the species survival.”).
206 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 931. Although NMFS failed to clearly analyze the impact of its
measures on recovery, Judge Simon seemed willing to imply that the expected habitat improvements
would benefit juvenile salmon enough to allow some degree of recovery. Id. at 931–33.
207 Id. at 933–34.
208 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012) (requiring all federal agencies to “include in every recommendation or
report on proposals for . . . major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on—(i) the environmental impact of the
proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action. . . .”). Note that the obligation to comply with
NEPA rests with the action agencies, not NMFS. See San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747
F.3d 581, 641–42 (9th Cir. 2014).
209 See NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 936. In November 1995, the action agencies prepared a
programmatic EIS on Columbia Basin hydroelectric operations that was incorporated into the 1995 BiOp.
BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN. ET AL., COLUMBIA RIVER SYSTEM OPERATION REVIEW: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT 5 (1995), https://perma.cc/K85Z-9ECF.
201
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with NEPA through pre-existing EISs—some dating back to 1992, some involving
more recent individual project EISs.210
The NEPA violation was premised on a recent Ninth Circuit decision holding
that a BiOp on the effect of the operation of water projects in the Sacramento–San
Joaquin Delta on the threatened delta smelt required an EIS.211 Judge Simon
rejected the government’s contention that a decision not to prepare either an EIS
or an environmental assessment was entitled to deference, pointing out that the
NEPA documents on which the government relied were stale, unrelated, or
irrelevant.212 He determined that the seventy-three mitigation measures, “designed
to work synergistically,” were “connected actions” justifying a single,
comprehensive EIS.213 The programmatic EIS on the 2014 BiOp’s mitigation
measures thatJudge Simon ordered is to cure stale information contained in existing
project-based NEPA documents, reflect new scientific information, account for new
species listings, and consider cumulative effects. 214
Judge Simon suggested that the NEPA process could serve as a vehicle to
induce the parties to think things through in a comprehensive manner, 215 a
sentiment similar to that voiced by Judge Redden when he encouraged the parties
to engage in discussions to reach a consensus regarding summer spills.216 The
210 See NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 935–36. Judge Simon observed that action agencies’
determination of the scope of an EIS (e.g., the decision not to produce a single, programmatic EIS)
typically obtains judicial deference. Id. at 935. However, he decided the decision not to produce a
comprehensive EIS for the 2014 BiOp RPA was unreasonable because the older NEPA documents were
outdated and thus too stale for use to justify the 2014 BiOp, especially given several new species listings,
additional designated critical habitat, and significant new scientific information relating to climate
change effects. Id. at 937. The government’s claims that these documents sufficed for NEPA purposes
on the ground that there were no significant changes to the proposed action since the 1990s fared poorly
because in the course of its jeopardy analysis, the government also argued that it made numerous and
significant positive changes to habitat, predation control, and project operations in order to avoid
jeopardy and adverse modification of habitat. Id. at 936–37.
211 Id. at 935 (“[A]ction agencies adopting an ROD implementing a biological opinion generally must
prepare an EIS.” (citing Jewell, 747 F.3d at 640–42)).
212 Id. at 934–38.
213 Id. at 939 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)). The court also concluded that the BiOp’s mitigation
measures were “cumulative actions” requiring a single EIS and dismissed the government’s argument
that such an EIS was infeasible or impractical. Id. at 944-47 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2)).
214 Id. at 936–37 (citing N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 1067, 1086 (9th
Cir. 2011); Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1031 (9th Cir. 2005)) (“It strains credulity to assert
that information regarding habitat and fish population remains the same in 2014 as it did in the 1990s.”).
215 Id. at 876–77 (“One of the benefits of a comprehensive environmental impact statement, which
requires that all reasonable alternatives be analyzed and evaluated, is that it may be able to break
through any logjam that simply maintains the precarious status quo. A comprehensive environmental
impact statement may allow, even encourage, new and innovative solutions to be developed, discussed,
and considered. The federal agencies, the public, and our public officials then will be in a better position
to evaluate the costs and benefits of various alternatives and to make important decisions.”). NEPA
further requires agencies to give all reasonable alternatives a “hard look” and to force consideration
environmental considerations into agency decision-making processes. Id. at 875. Judge Simon gave this
example: “[T]he option of breaching, bypassing, or even removing a dam may be considered more
financially prudent and environmentally effective than spending hundreds of millions of dollars more on
uncertain habitat restoration and other alternative actions.” Id. at 875–76.
216 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-cv-0640-RE, 2005 WL 1398223, at *5
(D. Or. June 10, 2005), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 422 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2005) (“I encourage the
parties to engage in discussions to reach a consensus on issues of spill, and to advise me if one is reached
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alternatives analysis required by NEPA would likely be more broad-ranging than the
analysis under the ESA, since it could include actions that “may not be funded and
are outside the jurisdiction of the lead agency.”217 According to Judge Simon, the
ESA alternatives analysis is narrower in that it only requires consideration of RPAs
that are “reasonably certain to occur, with specific and binding plans and
committed resources.”218 These requirements could rule out consideration of dam
breaching in a BiOp, but it may merit consideration in an EIS. In fact, one reasonable
NEPA alternative apparently endorsed by the court was breaching the four lower
Snake River dams.219
Judge Simon relied on several decisions for the proposition that the collective
effect of NMFS’s suite of seventy-three RPA actions was precisely the “type[] of
agency plans or programs [that] require a single EIS.” 220 The purpose of requiring a
single programmatic EIS on the 2014 BiOp was “so that the Action Agencies, the
public, and public officials can take a hard look at the programmatic plan to offset
the adverse effects of the FCRPS and consider the reasonable alternatives.” 221
According to Simon, only a programmatic EIS would allow the public to meaningfully
compare alternatives.222 The fact that NEPA compliance may be “time consuming
or costly” did not excuse the agency from complying with NEPA.223
An example of the interplay between the mitigation called for by the 2014
BiOp and NEPA procedures is RPA 46, promising a management plan to reduce
predation of juvenile salmon by double-crested cormorants in the Columbia River
estuary by killing the seabirds.224 Cormorants—aquatic birds whose diet includes
juvenile salmonids—significantly increased in and around the estuary in recent
during the period covered by my 2005 summer spill order. Otherwise, the spill shall proceed in
accordance with this order.”).
217 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 934; see also 40 C.F.R § 1502.14 (2016) (describing the alternatives
analysis as “the heart of environmental impact assessment”).
218 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 934.
219 Id. at 942 (“Although the Court is not predetermining any specific aspect of what a compliant
NEPA analysis would look like in this case, it may well require consideration of the reasonable alternative
of breaching, bypassing, or removing one or more of the Snake River Dams.”).
220 Id. at 938–39 (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 400–01, 409, 415 (1976); Pac. Coast Fed’n.
of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 693 F.3d 1082, 1098 n.12 (9th Cir. 2005); Earth
Island Ins. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1304–05 (9th Cir. 2003); Native Ecosystems Council v.
Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 893–94 (9th Cir. 2002); City of Tenakee Springs v. Clough, 915 F.2d 1308, 1312
(9th Cir. 1990)).
221 Id. at 940 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b)).
222 Id. (“Without a single or programmatic EIS, no other site-specific EIS provides the opportunity to
meaningfully consider programmatic alternatives, such as comparing the cost and effects of dam bypass
with the cost and effects of habitat mitigation, or determining if some other alternative provides enough
survival benefit to replace killing the [double-crested cormorant].”). Judge Simon also noted that the
flexibility of NEPA regulations to “tier” an EIS is an answer to the government’s argument that forcing
the agency to aggregate diverse actions risks paralysis of agency decision making. Id. at 944–45 (citing
‘Ilio’ulaokalani v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 2006)).
223 Id. at 947 (citing San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 644 (9th Cir.
2014)). On July 6 2016, Judge Simon ordered the federal government to complete NEPA scoping by
September 30, 2017, and he scheduled status conference for November 30, 2017. See Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No., 3:01-cv-0640-SI, at 4 (D. Or. July 6, 2016), ECF No. 2089 (order
remanding 2014 BiOp). The deficiencies in ESA section 7 consultation must be completed by December
31, 2018. Id. at 5.
224 2014 BIOP, supra note 93, at 409–11.
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years, as much of their habitat declined elsewhere along the West Coast. 225 In its
2008 BiOp, NMFS first called for a cormorant management program, but it did not
authorize the killing any cormorants or attempt to estimate the benefits that culling
the bird population would have on increased survival of listed salmonids. 226
In their challenge to the 2008 BiOp, the plaintiffs observed that NMFS’s
estimates of salmonid productivity did not account for the increase in the
cormorant population.227 Recognizing its oversight, NMFS later calculated that its
2008 BiOp had overestimated productivity of salmon and steelhead, resulting in a
so-called “survival gap” of 3.6% for steelhead and 1.1% for upriver chinook
salmon.228 NMFS therefore revised RPA 46 in its 2014 BiOp to call for reducing the
cormorant population nesting on East Sand Island in the Columbia River estuary to
below six thousand nesting pairs, almost a three-fold decline, in order to reduce
bird consumption of juvenile salmon to the level that the 2008 BiOp erroneously
assumed.229 In his decision remanding the 2014 BiOp, Judge Simon deferred to
NMFS’s RPA on the cormorant program.230
The 2014 BiOp tasked the Corps with implementing RPA 46’s cormorant-killing
program.231 The Corps proceeded to prepare an EIS on the program that considered
four alternatives that focused exclusively on killing or dispersing cormorants, plus

225 See Cassandra Profita, Corps Plans to Kill Nearly 16,000 Cormorants Nesting in Columbia River,
OR. PUB. BROADCASTING (June 12, 2014, rev. Feb. 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/KC4K-4A6F (reporting that
scientists estimate cormorants regularly consume 10%–15% of the juvenile salmon passing through the
estuary).
226 2008 BIOP, supra note 29, at 8-15 (stating that benefits for the migrating salmons are not
quantifiable due to absence of plan to control double-crested cormorants); id. at 8-3 to -26 (calling for
development of a plan including research and “actions, if warranted, in the estuary”); id. app. at 65, 92
(containing RPAs that research and manage cormorants). Double-crested cormorants are seabirds
whose diet is largely fish. Columbia Basin Bulletin, For Second Year, Corps Issued Permit to Cull
Cormorants in Lower Columbia; Allows killing 3,216 birds, CHINOOK OBSERVER (Apr. 1, 2016),
https://perma.cc/WUG3-PR7H. They are native to the Columbia Basin; their largest colony is now on
East Sand Island in the Columbia estuary—an island created by the Corps’ navigation maintenance
dredging—where their population grew from 100 breeding pairs on 1989 to more than 15,000 in 2013.
Id.
227 Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion and Memorandum at 38–42, NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d 861
(No. 3:01-cv-0640-SI), ECF No. 1976.
228 Audubon Soc’y of Portland v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 3:15-cv-655-SI, 2016 WL 4577009, at
*2 (D. Or. Aug. 31, 2016). The plaintiffs challenged these “survival gap” figures, claiming that the
government’s assumption of zero “compensatory mortality” associated with the cormorant program
(i.e., that all juvenile salmon escaping cormorant predation would survive all other sources of mortality
on their long journey and return as adults to spawn in the rivers) was fanciful. Id. at *10. Judge Simon
did not accept the agency’s claims of zero compensatory mortality, but he did defer to the agency on
what he thought was considerable scientific uncertainty over compensatory mortality. Id. at *13
(“[A]lthough the survival gap . . . is not likely as high as [estimated], it is not zero. This means that at least
some of the many millions of juvenile salmonids eaten each year by [cormorants] would return to spawn
if the [cormorant] population were reduced.”).
229 See id. at *2 (discussing a reduction of double-crested cormorant populations to their “‘Base
Period’ levels of no more than 5,380–5,939 nesting pairs”).
230 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 949.
231 2014 BIOP, supra note 93, at 410.
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the required “no action” alternative. 232 In 2015, the Corps adopted a plan to kill
some 10,912 double-crested cormorants and destroy 26,096 nests over four
years.233 None of the alternatives considered making up the salmon “survival gap”
by altering hydropower operations or taking other operational measures to
increase salmon productivity.234
The Corps then applied to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, a
cooperating agency on the Corps’ EIS, for a depredation permit under the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act235 (MBTA) to kill the cormorants, which the Service granted in 2015
and 2016—and would have to grant in future years under the program. 236 Several
wildlife groups led by the Audubon Society of Portland filed suit, challenging the
adequacy of the Corps’ EIS and the legality of the depredation permits. 237 The heart
of their challenge was an allegation that the Corps violated NEPA by failing to
consider a reasonable range of alternatives to the proposed program.238
Judge Simon agreed with the plaintiffs that the Corps failed to evaluate a
sufficient range of alternative measures and dismissed the federal argument that
his earlier order of a comprehensive EIS on the implementation of all RPA measures
mooted the case.239 He also faulted the government’s assumption that RPA 46
reduced the range of reasonable alternatives that NEPA required the Corps to
consider, rejecting the allegation that the RPA imposed a nondiscretionary duty on
the Corps to implement the cormorant program. 240 Despite these rulings, Judge
Simon refused to enjoin the cormorant killing, largely on the same ground as his

232 PORTLAND DIST., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, DOUBLE-CRESTED CORMORANT MANAGEMENT PLAN TO REDUCE
PREDATION OF JUVENILE SALMONIDS IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER ESTUARY: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, at
ES-13 to -16 & tbl.ES-2 (2015), https://perma.cc/V34Q-YYQ5.
233 NW. DIV., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, RECORD OF DECISION: DOUBLE-CRESTED CORMORANT MANAGEMENT
PLAN TO REDUCE PREDATION OF JUVENILE SALMONIDS IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER ESTUARY ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT 1, 4 (2015), https://perma.cc/6JAH-7GSL.
234 Audubon Soc’y of Portland, 2016 WL 4577009, at *5.
235 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–711 (2012).
236 MIGRATORY BIRD & HABITAT PROGRAM, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., DEPREDATION PERMIT ASSOCIATED WITH
DOUBLE-CRESTED CORMORANT MANAGEMENT PLAN TO REDUCE PREDATION OF JUVENILE SALMONIDS IN THE COLUMBIA
RIVER ESTUARY 2 (2015), https://perma.cc/85MF-4N3C; see also Audubon Soc’y of Portland, 2016 WL
4577009, at *3. The United States Department of Agriculture’s Wildlife Service, which was also a
cooperating agency on the Corps’ EIS, assists the Corps in carrying out the cormorant program. Audubon
Soc’y of Portland, 2016 WL 4577009, at *3.
237 In addition to Portland Audubon, the groups included the Wildlife Center of the North Coast, the
Animal Legal Defense Fund, the Center for Biological Diversity, and Friends of Animals. Audubon Soc’y of
Portland, 2016 WL 4577009, at *1.
238 Id. at *4. The plaintiffs also claimed that the Corps crafted an unreasonably narrow “purpose and
need” statement for the program by focusing only on juvenile salmon survival and failed to take a hard
look at the alleged benefits that the program would have in terms of increasing adult returns of the listed
salmon. Id. They further alleged an MBTA violation, claiming that the depredation permits would reduce
the cormorant population to an unsustainable level, threatening the population’s existence. Id. Judge
Simon rejected these claims, deferring to the expertise of the agency in the face of scientific uncertainty
about the benefits of the program. Id. at *14–16.
239 Id. at *7–8.
240 See id. at *10–11 (quoting Res. Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300, 1304 (9th Cir. 1993)) (“An
agency cannot abrogate its responsibility to ensure that its actions will not jeopardize listed species; its
decision to rely on a [BiOp] must not have been arbitrary or capricious.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2858098

PW2.BLUMMFRYJAMIN (DO NOT DELETE)

134

6/16/2017 11:20 AM

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 47:N

ruling in the BiOp decision: giving the benefit of the doubt to the listed salmon
species.241
The cormorant decision illustrates the weakness underlying Judge Simon’s
faith in the NEPA process to reveal tradeoffs among RPAs and force federal
managers to consider a broader range of alternatives than under the ESA. NEPA
authorizes agencies to protect the environment, but it does not require
environmental protection.242 The NEPA process does provide the public and other
agencies an opportunity to communicate their preferred outcomes with
administrative decision makers, but NEPA requires only that decision makers listen,
not that they accommodate public or other agency concerns. Moreover, judges
have no obligation to enjoin even actions that clearly violate NEPA.243 The statute is
therefore hardly a panacea for Columbia River salmon restoration—even if, as
Judge Simon suggested, it could require consideration of changed dam operations
or removal of the lower Snake River dams. 244 Although the Corps violated NEPA in
approving the cormorant-killing program, that violation did not halt the program,
one that ironically reduces predation primarily on hatchery fish, which are not
generally protected by the ESA.245 Similarly, the hope that NEPA procedures will
promote resolution of decades-old problems that the operation of Columbia Basin
dams cause for listed salmon seems quixotic.
IV. THE 2017 SPILL DECISION
Judge Simon’s 2016 decision concluding that continued operation of FCRPS
dams under the 2014 BiOp would violate both the ESA and NEPA included no
interim injunctive relief pending procedural compliance with those statutes.
However, the federal government acknowledged that the plaintiffs could move for
injunctive relief later, and the court retained continuing jurisdiction to ensure the
implementation of revised mitigation measures, a new BiOp, and a new EIS

241 Id. at *12–13 (noting that vacatur is not required where vacating an illegal agency decision would
produce inequitable results).
242 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1988) (“NEPA itself does not
mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process.”).
243 Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency., 688 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2012).
244 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 944 (D. Or. 2016).
245 NMFS’s hatchery policy allows the agency to include hatchery salmon and steelhead within a
“distinct population segment”—termed an ESU in the case of Pacific salmonids—when determining
whether to list the ESU as endangered or threatened under the ESA. Policy on the Consideration of
Hatchery-Origin Fish in Endangered Species Act Listing Determinations for Pacific Salmon and Steelhead,
70 Fed. Reg. 37,204, 37,215 (June 28, 2005); ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2012) (defining species to include
“any distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when
mature”). Despite concluding that court decisions precluded the agency's early efforts to exclude
hatchery fish when it delineated an ESU, NMFS stressed that “the intent of the ESA is to conserve natural
self-sustaining populations and functioning ecosystems.” 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,205, 37,207–08. (citing Alsea
Valley All. v. Evans, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (D. Or. 2001)). Therefore, the hatchery policy calls for NMFS to
make decisions as to whether to list a given ESU as threatened or endangered in part by assessing
whether the presence of hatchery fish provides conservation benefits for the entire ESU, or whether
hatchery fish instead pose genetic and ecological risks to the ESU's naturally-spawning component. See
id. at 37,215. The policy was upheld in Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 559 F.3d 946, 957–959 (9th Cir. 2009).
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complying with federal law.246 After the parties agreed to a five-year schedule for
the comprehensive EIS that Judge Simon ordered, the plaintiffs asked for interim
injunctive relief that would 1) increase spills at mainstem dams to facilitate juvenile
fish passage, 2) begin earlier monitoring of smolt migration each year, and 3) stop
large capital expenditures at the four lower Snake Dams pending preparation of the
forthcoming EIS, so as to not prejudice the alternative of recommending removal of
those dams.247
In March 2017,248 roughly eleven months after striking down the 2014 BiOp,
Judge Simon granted injunctive relief on the first two issues beginning in 2018 and
indicated that large capital expenditures could “create a significant risk of bias in
the NEPA process,” although he declined to stop two projects at Ice Harbor dam
aimed at improving fish passage.249 This “spill injunction” built on Judge Redden’s
2005 injunction, but will require larger spills,250 which Judge Simon justified on the
grounds that the listed salmonids are “highly vulnerable for many reasons, including
because they have precariously remained at low abundance for some time, are
susceptible to devastating effects from climatic events, such as occurred in 2015,
and are without any survival ‘cushion’ in the 2014 BiOp and its RPAs.”251 He
therefore reaffirmed Judge Redden’s 2005 decision to order spill over the “vigorous
objections” of the federal government, intervenors, and amici because it could
“offer immediate survival benefits,” a finding of Judge Redden that, as Judge Simon
observed, “has proven accurate, as all parties now agree.” 252 But the government
did convince Simon of the need to “calculate[] appropriate spill patterns” at each
dam rather than impose a blanket spill increase, and he therefore allowed a year
246 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-cv-0640-SI, 2017 WL 1829588, at *3–
4 (D. Or. Apr. 3, 2017).
247 Id. at *1, *3.
248 Judge Simon initially issued an opinion and order on March 27, 2017; that order was superseded
by an amended opinion and order issued on April 3, 2017. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries
Serv., No. 3:01-cv-0640-SI, 2017 WL 1135610 (D. Or. Mar. 27, 2017), opinion amended and superseded,
No. 3:01-cv-0640-SI, 2017 WL 1829588 (D. Or. Apr. 3, 2017). No substantive changes were made in the
amended opinion and order. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 2017 WL 1829588, at *1 n.1.
249 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 2017 WL 1829588, at *9–11, *14–16. Interim injunctive relief was
appropriate, in Judge Simon’s view, because the ongoing dam operations presented “imminent harm”
to the listed species. Id. at *6 (citing a number of Ninth Circuit and district court cases).
250 Id. at *9. Plaintiffs’ proposed spills of 115% of total dissolved gas in the dams’ forebays and 120%
in the tailraces, arguing that the government had tested higher levels of dissolved gas—125% in both
the forebays and tailraces—with little evidence of gas bubble disease, which is often fatal to juvenile
fish. Id. at *7.The Plaintiffs sought spill on a 24-hour basis from April 10 through June 15 at Bonneville,
The Dalles, John Day, and McNary Dams and at Ice Harbor, Lower Monumental, Little Goose, and Lower
Granite Dams from April 3 through June 20. Id. at *1. These spills could be changed by the Corps under
certain spill conditions or to address specific biological concerns. Id.
251 Id. at *6. Increased spill was supported by NMFS’s ISAB as well as a number of other scientific
studies. See id. at *7. The federal government suggested that it might consider increased spill in the next
BiOp, but Judge Simon thought that the listed species were “in need of additional survival protections
now” and rejected “[k]icking the can down the road.” Id. *8. Judge Simon cited an expert from the State
of Washington who suggested that additional spill was “credible, and deserving of further scientific
investigation,” with a focus on the optimum spill at each individual dam, sentiments that the judge found
were widely shared, at least among the defendants and their allies. Id. at *8 (quoting Declaration of Bill
Tweit Submitted in Support of Washington’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motions for Injunctive Relief at 10,
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 2017 WL 1829588 (No. 3:01-cv-0640-SI), ECF No. 2137).
252 Id. at *8, *16.
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for testing and developing optimum spill levels, delaying the imposition of his
injunction until spring 2018.253
As for the plaintiffs’ request that the judge enjoin large capital expenditures at
the lower Snake River, Simon agreed that financial commitments could bias the
NEPA process through the so-called “bureaucratic steamroller” effect—in which
expenditures and agency momentum can prejudice the selection of alternatives. 254
As a result, he concluded that “spending hundreds, tens, or even millions of dollars
on the four lower Snake River dams during the NEPA remand period is likely to cause
irreparable harm by creating a significant risk of bias in the NEPA process.” 255
However, the court indicated that any injunction concerning dam expenditures did
not apply to safety measures, rejected a “blanket injunction” for all expenditures
over $1 million, and proceeded to approve two projects at Ice Harbor Dam because
they promised “substantial immediate survival improvement” of juvenile salmon. 256
The new spill injunction, once implemented, will be the most significant
substantive improvement in salmon migration since Judge Redden’s injunction in
2005.257 Although it was only interim injunctive relief, pending compliance with the
ESA and NEPA, it represented a clear counterweight to two decades of federal
efforts that, in Judge Simon’s words, “Kick[ed] the can down the road” in favor of
maintaining, as much as possible, status quo hydroelectric operations. 258 Judge
Simon has now joined Judge Redden in resisting this longstanding federal effort to
delay changing dam operations to benefit listed salmon.
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SIMON DECISION
The Simon decision was only the latest in a long series of decisions reflecting
considerable judicial skepticism of federal efforts to comply with the ESA in the case
of Columbia Basin salmon.259 But it was the most far-reaching.
253 Id. at *9–10. Judge Simon also delayed the imposition of early monitoring of smolt migration
(through so-called PIT tags) until March 1, 2018. Id. at *11. Judge Simon rejected the plaintiffs’ request
to limit spill adjustments for biological reasons only if no member of the Fish Passage Advisory
Committee (which includes fishery agency and tribal members) objected. Id. at *1, *10. Judge Simon
found “no evidence that the current system is not sufficiently working to be able to implement additional
spill,” or that “minority voices” needed an opportunity to be heard because “current decisionmakers are
more policy-focused than science-driven.” Id. at *10. Consequently, he decided not to implement a
system “requiring unanimity” of committee members “at this time.” Id. But he left the door open to such
claims in the future if backed by evidence, stating that “[i]f, after additional spill begins, the Spill Plaintiffs
or any other party has evidence that the current system is not working, that party may then file a motion
with the Court.” Id.
254 Id. at *12–14 (adopting the “bureaucratic steamroller or momentum theory” recognized in Sierra
Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1989)).
255 Id. at *14.
256 Id. at *14–15. The court noted that if the plaintiffs believed that a project was not a safety
measure and “substantially may bias the NEPA process,” they could file a motion to that effect with the
court. Id. at *15.
257 See generally Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 7, at 133–35 (discussing the 2005 spill decision).
258 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 2017 WL 1829588, at *8.
259 E.g., Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 900 (D. Or.
1994) (Marsh, J.), vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing the process behind the 1993
BiOp as “seriously, ‘significantly,’ flawed”); see also Blumm & Corbin, supra note 6, at 551 (discussing
Judge Marsh’s decision).
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Judges Marsh and Redden both expressed deep reservations about what the
government was proposing,260 but neither was willing to seriously interfere with
status quo operations of the federal dam system.261 Except for spills at specific dams
ordered by Judge Redden beginning in 2005, and increased by Judge Simon in
2018,262 the status quo has largely prevailed, at least in terms of project operations.
The explanation must lie in the nonjudicial persuasiveness of BPA and its deep
pockets.263 One of the Columbia Basin salmon saga’s ironies is that BPA’s
coordination of the FCRPS—dominant since 1964, if not before264—made the
agency the region’s chief electric power entity also made BPA most responsible for
the salmon’s decline in the Columbia Basin. Yet, BPA has also now become the
government’s principal agency funding salmon recovery, giving the agency
significant control over the type and timining of salmon recovery measures.265 The
power of BPA’s funding was evident in its ability to persuade a majority of Columbia
Basin tribes to switch sides in the litigation in exchange for substantial funding of
habitat restoration.266
A related irony is that NMFS, the agency charged by Congress with protecting
endangered species, would become the leading federal apologist for maintaining
status quo hydroelectric operations damaging salmon. In the era before it acquired
decision-making authority through the Columbia Basin salmon ESA listings, NMFS
was a member of a coalition of federal and state agencies and Indian tribes that
advocated for changing FCRPS operations. 267 Once vested with decision-making
260 E.g., Am. Rivers v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. Civ. 96–384–MA, 1997 WL 33797790, at *10
(D. Or. Apr. 3, 1997) (Marsh, J.) (questioning the soundness of the selected level of risk acceptance in the
BiOp); NMFS I, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1215 (D. Or. 2003) (Redden, J.) (finding the government’s actions
to be arbitrary and capricious); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV 01–6940–RE,
2004 WL 1698050, at *5–6 (D. Or. July 29, 2004) (Redden, J.) (same).
261 See Practicing Deception, supra note 5, at 809 (explaining that forces supporting the status quo
were relying on the limits of judicial review to avoid making substantial changes); supra Part II.B
(discussing the decisions issued by Judges Marsh and Redden).
262 See supra Part IV.
263 See BPA’s Annual Costs for Basin Fish and Wildlife Mitigation Expected to Nudge Above $500
Million, COLUMBIA BASIN FISH & WILDLIFE NEWS BULL. (July 11, 2014), https://perma.cc/S8H4-P2WE
(explaining that BPA funds have produced a substantial amount of habitat restoration); Harrison, supra
note 4 (explaining that off-site mitigation has been insufficient to make progress recovering listed
salmon). Whether it will do so in the future is the fundamental question at the root of the last two
decades of BiOp litigation.
264 Michael C. Blumm, The Northwest’s Hydroelectric Heritage: Prologue to the Northwest Power
Planning and Conservation Act, 58 WASH. L. REV. 175, 217–19 (1983) (discussing various coordination
agreements and California power marketing in the wake of the signing of the 1961 Columbia River Treaty
with Canada that contributed to the rise of BPA as the central power planning agency of the Columbia
Basin). The Treaty, signed in 1961, entered into force in 1964. Columbia River Basin Treaty: Cooperative
Development of Water Resources, Can.-U.S., Jan. 17, 1961, 15 U.S.T. 1555.
265 See BPA’s Annual Costs for Basin Fish and Wildlife Mitigation Expected to Nudge Above $500
Million, THE COLUMBIA BASIN FISH & WILDLIFE NEWS BULL. (July 11, 2014), https://perma.cc/6Z9S-DW4U
(explaining that BPA’s annual costs on recovery efforts are over $500 million per year).
266 See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
267 See Michael C. Blumm & F. Lorraine Bodi, Northwest Power Act: “Fish Coequal with Hydropower”,
in THE NORTHWEST SALMON CRISIS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 262–64 (Joseph Cone & Sandy Ridlington eds.,
1996) (discussing the recommendations of a coalition of federal, state, and tribal agencies, including
NMFS, to the Northwest Power Planning Council to formulate a Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program in 1981).
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authority, however, NMFS became a voice against increased water flows beneficial
to salmon and for more artificial transport of juvenile by truck and barge around
FCRPS projects.268
The 2014 BiOp that Judge Simon found wanting reflected a fracturing of the
agency and tribal coalition that once argued for changed hydropower operations. 269
Not only did the federal fishery agencies drop out of the coalition, among the states
only Oregon continued to challenge the BiOp. 270 Among the tribes, only the Nez
Perce—the most geographically disadvantaged Stevens Treaty tribe—remained in
the litigation.271 The institutional forces of the 21st century were apparently
scattering ones.
Although both his predecessors thought NMFS BiOps failed to satisfy the ESA,
Judge Simon’s 149-page opinion represented a higher level of judicial scrutiny of
ESA implementation. Judge Simon’s decision was in fact a paradigmatic example of
hard look review. This level of judicial scrutiny is justified by decades of obfuscation
and deception by the involved federal agencies whose chief goal has been to shield
FCRPS operations from salmon-induced changes. To a remarkable extent, the
agencies have, over the years, largely succeeded.272 It is possible that Judge Simon’s
sense of this sorry history influenced his review.
Judge Simon’s searching review focused on the recommendations of a number
of scientific advisory committees, emphasizing instances where the 2014 BiOp
diverged from those recommendations. 273 These inconsistencies undermined
NMFS’s claims for judicial deference to its administrative judgment. So did
repeated, longstanding overstatements about the effectiveness of planned

268 See Blumm & Corbin, supra note 6, at 591–92 (discussing the evolution of NMFS’s position as it
obtained decision-making authority).
269 In addition to NMFS, the “fishery coalition” of the 1980s included the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service; state fish and wildlife agencies from Idaho, Oregon, and Washington; and numerous
Columbia Basin tribes. These entities cooperated on the submission of program recommendations to
the Northwest Power Planning Council in 1981. Michael C. Blumm, Implementing the Parity Promise: An
Evaluation of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 14 ENVTL. L. 277, 284–86 (1984) [hereinafter
Blumm, Implementing Parity] (discussing the goals of the fishery coalition).
270 Michael C. Blumm, Opinion, Salmon Are Flourishing Because of Judge’s Orders, OREGONIAN (Nov.
8, 2014), https://perma.cc/K2T9-JDZ6. Idaho signed the Columbia Basin Fish Accords and received
funding, but Washington did not actually sign a BiOp-related Accord since it had decided to support the
2008 BiOp (and ensuing ones), and received federal funding. See supra note 9. During the many years of
litigation over whether the federal government complied with the ESA concerning its FCRPS operations,
the Northwest Power and Conservation Council, an interstate compact agency directed by Congress to
produce a program for the Columbia Basin to protect, mitigate and enhance fish and wildlife, has been
largely silent and passive. Mission and Strategy, NW. POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL,
https://perma.cc/W73B-SRRF (last visited Apr. 15, 2017). For example, when BPA attempted to defund
the Fish Passage Center, established by the Council’s program to provide information on the effects of
program measures on fish survival, the Council largely failed to defend the Center, intervening in the
litigation which successfully challenged BPA’s defunding efforts only to mention to the court that the
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act (Northwest Power Act), 16 U.S.C. §§
839–839h (2012), required BPA to act “consistent” with its program. Brief of Intervenor Nw. Power &
Conservation Council, Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin, 477 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2007) (Nos.
06-70430, 06-71182), 2006 WL 2986799.
271 See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying discussion.
272 See generally Practicing Deception, supra note 5, at 713.
273 See supra Part III.A–B.
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mitigation.274 Given the number of BiOps that failed review BiOps previously, there
were plenty of inconsistencies that weakened NMFS claims to deferential judicial
review.275
Another irony of the Simon decision was that time—long apparently on the
side of BPA and NMFS, as courts refused to enjoin, with one notable exception
concerning spills,276 status quo FCRPS operations—worked against the federal
defendants in this case. Now, the long history of failure seemed to outweigh claims
of administrative expertise. Judge Simon’s hard look review was probably the result
of both the federal failure to follow scientific advice and the repeated inability to
deliver on asserted benefits of mitigation.
Judge Simon not only reiterated Judge Redden’s rulings that mitigation
measures had to be reasonably certain to occur, 277 he rejected NMFS’s proffered
interpretation of avoiding jeopardy to the listed salmon as merely putting the
species on a track of trending toward recovery. 278 He criticized the government’s
standard because the government could satisfy the “trending” interpretation
without any real improvement in run sizes, no matter how desperate the existing
condition of the listed species.279
A troubling aspect of the Simon decision was its interpretation of whether the
proposed operations would adversely modify designated critical habitat. Judge
Simon ruled that the standard NMFS used to evaluate effects on critical habitat—
“retaining the current ability to become functional”—was inconsistent with the
ESA.280 But he then proceeded to sustain NMFS’s claim that the agency satisfied the
statute with its mitigation measures concerning critical habitat protection, using an
analysis that seemed inconsistent with his reasoning on the jeopardy standard.281
In addition to rejecting NMFS’s interpretation of recovery, the Simon decision
made at least two important interpretations of the ESA that may prove influential.
First, the decision repeatedly construed the statute to require that NMFS give the
“benefit of the doubt” to the listed salmon, making clear that the burden of
uncertainty—long referenced by those seeking to block significant changes in FCRPS
operations282—would no longer be acceptable as a justification for refusing to
undertake meaningful and verifiable action to protect and restore listed species. 283
Second, remedial actions in a BiOp require a margin of safety, a “cushion,” to guard

274

See supra notes 148–149 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
276 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-cv-0640-RE, 2005 WL 1398223, at *5
(D. Or. June 10, 2005) (Redden, J.) (order granting in part an injunction requiring water to be spilled over
the lower Snake River dams); supra Part IV (discussing Judge Simon’s decision to increase spills).
277 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 870–71 (citing NMFS I, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1211–12 (D. Or. 2003)
and NMFS II, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1130–31 (D. Or. 2011).
278 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 891–95; see also supra Part III.A.
279 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 890; see also text accompanying supra note 100.
280 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 930.
281 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 930–31. For a more in-depth discussion of this issue, see supra notes
193–206 and accompanying text.
282 Id. at 873; see also Nw. Res. Info. Ctr. v. Nw. Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that the Northwest Power Act “marked a shift of the burden of uncertainty . . . from the
salmon to the hydropower system”).
283 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 873.
275
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against overoptimistic predictions.284 These requirements are in addition to Judge
Simon’s reaffirmation that the ESA requires BiOp measures to be reasonably certain
to occur and could be persuasive in the future. The 2017 spill injunction gave the
benefit of the doubt to listed species and ordered increased interim spills,
constituting a significant refocusing of attention on the operation of the dams that
are the primary cause for the imperiled status of the salmon. 285
A pioneering aspect of the Simon decision was its call for a comprehensive EIS
that would consider a broader range of alternatives than NMFS has considered in
its BiOps, including the costs and benefits of breaching the dams on the lower Snake
River.286 Employing NEPA to evaluate BiOp measures is a relatively recent judicial
development, ushered in by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in San Luis & DeltaMendota Water Authority v. Jewell.287 There is some irony in this judicial reliance
on a statute—often criticized for its nonsubstantive, procedural basis288—to
redirect the federal government’s focus beyond its off-site mitigation efforts to
reducing the adverse effects of FCRPS operations. 289 Judge Simon clearly thought
that a comprehensive EIS would prompt serious consideration of larger tradeoffs
on which the BiOps had not focused. However, long-term observers of the Columbia
Basin salmon saga may be skeptical about how the FCRPS agencies will employ their
discretion—which NEPA hardly restricts—to materially change the focus of
Columbia Basin salmon restoration through a programmatic EIS. 290
Ultimately, the Simon decision challenged the federal government to justify—
with much greater particularity than in the past—the efficacy of its mitigation plans.
Judges Marsh and Redden had repeatedly called for greater certainty that planned
mitigation measure would take place, but Judge Simon searched for evidence that
the mitigation was actually producing the benefits NMFS claimed would take

284

Id. at 909.
The benefit of the doubt to the listed species worked also to sustain the cormorant-kill program.
See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
286 NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 944. (“For example, the option of breaching, bypassing, or even
removing a dam may be considered more financially prudent and environmentally effective than
spending hundreds of millions of dollars more on uncertain habitat restoration and other alternative
actions.”).
287 747 F.3d 581, 642 (9th Cir. 2014).
288 E.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s
Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 905 (2002) (“From the critics’ vantage point, NEPA
appears to demand burdensome procedural formalities while accomplishing little or nothing of
substance.”).
289 The above interpretation is consistent with the federal definition of mitigation. See 40 C.F.R.
1508.20 (2016).
290 Judge Marsh observed in his 1994 decision that a major problem with NMFS’s BiOp was that it
failed to reflect the views of other agencies. Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
850 F. Supp. 886, 899–90 (D. Or. 1994), vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995). Judge Redden also
called for all parties to cooperate on measures to conserve the listed salmon. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l
Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-cv-0640-RE, 2005 WL 2488447, at *3 (D. Or. Oct. 7, 2005) (“There must
be cooperation between the parties and all of three branches of government.”), aff’d, 524 F.3d 917 (9th
Cir. 2008). Neither judicial suggestion produced much success. Whether NEPA procedures aimed at,
among other things, increasing interagency cooperation can produce material change may well be
doubted. And the cost of a comprehensive EIS will be considerable in terms of time and money.
285
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place.291 That kind of inquiry could, if sustained over time, undermine the BiOps’
heavy reliance on hatchery production.292 Moreover, the whole idea of emphasizing
off-site habitat restoration to the near exclusion of changes in project operations
needs public reconsideration. That approach seems clearly inconsistent with the
federal interpretation of mitigation, which favors operational changes over creating
substitute resources.293 The federal definition of mitigation has apparently been
inoperative in the Columbia Basin, and perhaps Judge Simon’s call to bring dam
breaching back on the table portends a shift towards a greater focus on operational
changes to the dams themselves.
VI. CONCLUSION
Judge Simon’s decision signaled a new era on the long-running Columbia Basin
salmon saga. Dating back to roughly 1980, when Congress called for a basinwide
restoration program for the fish and wildlife adversely affected by the construction
and operation of the FCRPS dams, 294 and continuing during the ESA-era beginning
in the 1990s, some $14 billion has been spent on Columbia Basin salmon recovery
efforts during the last forty years, mostly by the federal government. 295 In terms of
the condition of the listed salmon, these vast expenditures clearly have not
produced satisfactory results.
In many respects, the money has not been spent wisely, supporting a veritable
army of biologists, lawyers, and bureaucrats committed to hatchery operations and
habitat restoration with uncertain benefits in terms of listed salmon. 296 The amount
of mitigation expenditures is fairly astonishing, including enough money to

291 Compare Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game, 850 F. Supp. at 899–90 (Marsh, J.), and NMFS IV, 839 F.
Supp. 2d 1117, 1125–26 (D. Or. 2011) (Redden, J.), with NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 902–14 (Simon,
J.).
292 See PATRICK MCCULLY, SILENCED RIVERS: THE ECOLOGY AND POLITICS OF LARGE DAMS 51 (1996) (arguing
that despite hatcheries aimed at mitigating the effects of the Columbia Basin dams, “not only has the
number of adult salmon plummeted, but hatchery fish are degrading the genetic diversity of the
remaining wild salmon and helping push them toward extinction”).
293 See 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(e)(1) (2016) (“In general, in-kind mitigation is preferable to out-of-kind
mitigation because it is most likely to compensate for the functions and services lost at the impact site.”).
294 Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-501, § 4(h)(1)(A),
94 Stat. 2697, 2708 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(1) (2012)) (“The Council shall promptly develop and
adopt, pursuant to this subsection, a program to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife,
including related spawning grounds and habitat, on the Columbia River and its tributaries.”). See
generally Blumm, Implementing Parity, supra note 269, at 284–86.
295 See NW. POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL, 2014 COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM
COSTS REPORT: 14TH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NORTHWEST GOVERNORS 28 n.iii (2014), http://perma.cc/4TTD3M6S (reporting a “grand total of all fish and wildlife costs incurred by Bonneville from 1978 when the
costs began, through 2014, [of] $14.53 billion”); Press Release, Idaho Rivers United, Conservation Groups
Highlight Salmon Plan’s Shortcomings in Federal Court (July 1, 2015), https://perma.cc/UN7S-DBV9
(describing the amount as “more than $13 billion”).
296 In the late 1990s, FCRPS agencies developed a salmon restoration strategy of “4 Hs,” that would
account for hydropower, hatcheries, harvest, and habitat. See Cat Lazaroff, Four H’s of Salmon Recovery:
Habitat, Harvest, Hatcheries & Hydropower, ENVTL. NEWS SERV., (Nov. 18, 1999), https://perma.cc/9E7JA32Y. In many respects the recent BiOps are the result of the four H approach, since they reduce the
amount of mitigation necessary at the dams producing hydropower because of substantial efforts at
habitat restoration.
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encourage several tribes to drop out of the litigation.297 There may be legitimate
scientific debate around the merits of off-site mitigation versus operational changes
or dam removal. But after a quarter-century of failure of off-site mitigation to make
discernable progress recovering the listed salmon, the government’s position looks
increasingly arbitrary. Time, a former ally of the government, now has become an
opponent.
When viewed in light of the long arc of the salmon–hydropower struggle in the
Columbia Basin, Judge Simon’s opinion suggests a new way forward. In order to
survive the close judicial review likely ahead, the path now almost assuredly will
require government BiOps to reinterpret the ESA’s jeopardy standard to include a
margin of error that will ensure listed salmon receive the “benefit of the doubt.” 298
This new era could also prompt reconsideration of the merits of changing FCRPS
operations, perhaps reopening serious evaluation of breaching the lower Snake
River dams. The hope would be that the next twenty-five years will not prove to be
as fruitless as the last twenty-five.
VII. POSTSCRIPT
While this article was in press, in a sign that the optimism reflected in the
concluding paragraph above may be misplaced, four members of the Northwest’s
congressional delegation penned a letter to the BPA Administrator, alleging that
Judge Simon’s spill decision will produce “unintended consequences” that will
allegedly hurt salmon recovery and “greatly increase[] power costs.”299 The letter
claimed 2008 BiOp was “biologically and legally sound,” wholly ignoring Judge
Simon’s decision and posing a series of questions about the cost of the injunction
that the BPA Administrator was to answer.300 The letter also asked BPA to inform
the signatories of any status conferences or protocols concerning appropriate
revised spills at mainstem dams. One need not be too cynical about the long history
of the hydropower versus salmon conflict in the Columbia Basin to suggest that the
letter was drafted by BPA in an effort to resist increased spills in 2018, and that it
may be an omen of an appropriations rider overriding the court’s spill decision.

297

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
NMFS V, 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 873–906 (D. Or. 2016) (repeatedly referring to the requirement
that the salmon receive the “benefit of the doubt”).
299 Letter from Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-Wash.), Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-Or.), Rep. Dan
Newhouse (R-Wash.), and Rep. Kurt Schrader (D-Or.), to Elliot Mainzer, Adm’r, Bonnevill Power Admin.
(May 2, 2017) (on file with authors). For a discussion of the spill decision, see supra Part IV.
300 Letter from Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Rep. Peter DeFazio, Rep. Dan Newhouse, and Rep.
Kurt Schrader to Elliot Mainzer, supra note 299 (asking, inter alia, about BPA’s annual spending on fish
and wildlife, the resulting effect on a ratepayer’s monthly bill, salmon losses due to predation from sea
lions and birds, adverse consequences of increased spill, and the costs of the actions required to
implement the court’s order).
298

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2858098

PW2.BLUMMFRYJAMIN (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

6/16/2017 11:20 AM

STILL CRYING OUT

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2858098

143

